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1FEDERALISM AND TRANSNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE OF CITES 
IMPLEMENTATION IN CANADA
PART I: LEGITIMACY IN CANADIAN FEDERALISM 
1.0 Introduction 
Two trends in governance have marked the last 20 years: greater global interdependence and 
greater autonomy to minority groups in large states.  The international legal regime reflects this 
trend in its increasing reliance on internationally established institutional regimes.  Similarly, the 
legal regimes of individual states have become increasingly decentralized in response to calls for 
increased autonomy for minorities within states.  This raises interesting questions where federal 
states commit to international obligations and then attempt to implement the obligations 
domestically.   
This purpose of this paper is to examine how multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are 
legitimately implemented in the Canadian federation.  The purpose will be fulfilled first by 
examining the role legitimacy plays in implementation of MEAs in the Canadian federation.  
Second, the paper will examine how the general theory of legitimate implementation of MEAs 
manifested itself in the Canadian federation when Canada attempted to implement the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).    
In Part I of the paper I will explain the understanding of legitimacy in the international legal 
regime and in the context of federal governance, specifically in the Canadian federation.  An 
important tool in understanding legitimate policy implementation in the context of Canadian 
federalism is transnational legal theory.  Transnational legal theory examines how international 
law gains domestic acceptance through the interaction between institutional and non-institutional 
actors.  Through such interaction, the normative values of international law are “internalized” 
within the domestic population and international norms are accepted as legitimate. 1 Harold Koh 
 
1 H. H. Koh, “Transnational Legal Process” (1996), 75 Neb. Law Rev. 181 at 183-184. 
2maintains that this requires various state and non-state actors to work together to “internalize” 
international norms domestically.  Internalization requires deep grounding within political, 
economic and cultural systems.2 This grounding depends, I will argue, on the democratic 
legitimacy of the process.  
The notion of legitimacy as consent, however, becomes problematic when considering federal 
governance.  Federal governance emphasizes the relations between institutionalized political 
authorities at the federal and provincial levels.  Legitimacy of policy implementation is therefore 
understood differently in a federal governance context.  Legitimacy, which is primarily based on 
consent of the governed, cannot be achieved in a federal state without an appeal to “community”.  
When a given community senses that an implementation procedure is imposed on it, the members 
of that community will not accept it or “internalize” it.  Consequently, the first part of the paper 
will show that, in a federal state, legitimacy cannot be based on institutional action that affects a 
particular community represented by a constituent unit in a federation.  At a minimum, subjects 
of a federal state will view implementation as illegitimate without the consent of, or, at a 
minimum, consultation with, particularly affected political communities.  The level of 
consultation, meaning seeking opinions, alternative policy suggestions and comments from the 
affected communities, will vary depending on whether a given policy affects something a 
community associates deeply with its identity.   
Transnational legal theory, and its concomitant institutional interaction, is particularly suited to 
an effective examination of international policy implementation in the Canadian federation. The 
first part of the paper will demonstrate that implementation of international law in Canada is 
dependant on federal-provincial governmental cooperation and is therefore best described as an 
institutional process.  Institutionalism tells us that a community’s perception of legitimacy is 
governed by the formal contracts and laws as well as the “rules in use”.  Therefore legitimate 
policy implementation in Canada is judged by reference to the formal law of the constitution 
coupled with the “rules in use” as developed by years of federal-provincial diplomacy.    
3Part II of the paper will focus on the domestic implementation of CITES through the 
philosophical framework outlined in Part I.  The approach taken in Part II of the paper will be 
two-fold.  First, I will examine the specific obligations the convention places on the Canadian 
state.  Next, I will examine the legislative response of the federal government.    
While implementing the treaty, it became clear existing legislation met Canada’s bare 
obligations, the domestic legislation did not reflect the underlying broader norms of the 
convention. As a result the federal government embarked on creating a new legislative regime in 
response to the evolving understanding of a member state’s obligations under CITES.  The 
domestic implementation of both of these treaties involved extensive provincial consultation and 
stakeholder negotiation.   
2.0 Legitimacy and Transnational Legal Process 
2.1 Introduction: The Role of Consent in International Law 
The focus of this section of the paper is the role of legitimacy in successful domestic 
implementation of international law.  Legitimate authority is authority that is justified and 
accepted by the subjects of the authority.  Thus, a government is said to be legitimate where there 
are good arguments for a political order’s claim to be recognized as right and just; a legitimate 
order deserves recognition.3 Legitimate political orders are based on consent and not wide-
spread coercion.  As a result, consent is given where a regime or policy is perceived as legitimate.  
The degree of consent required may vary.  For example, if citizens or a community perceive that 
a particular policy will affect them specifically, greater consent, or consensus among 
stakeholders, may be required.  Likewise, the measure of legitimate policy-making will become 
more onerous.  Ultimately, legitmation is a process by which a legislator is authorized to 
 
2 O.R. Young, “Rights, Rules and resources in World Affairs”, in O.R. Young (ed) Governance in World Affairs,
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3 J. Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, (T. McCarthy trans.), (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) at 
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4promulgate a law as norm.4 Where a norm is internalized within society, the corresponding law 
will have legitimacy without the requirement of broad-based consensus building.   
Likewise, transnational legal process views voluntary consent as integral to domestic 
implementation of international law.  Domestic implementation of international law is two-
staged.  The “horizontal” level is dominated by institutional interaction in which sovereign states 
negotiate legal regimes.  Institutionalism is therefore a useful tool in examining the legitimacy of 
horizontal implementation of international law.  Institutionalism emphasises the importance of 
compliance with both formal legal implementation as well as consistency with “rules in use” that 
have been developed over a long period of institutional interaction.   
The “vertical” level refers to domestic implementation of international norms.  At this stage, the 
consent of the governed becomes important. Citizens of states do not negotiate the 
implementation of the domestic regime directly.  Nevertheless, consent of the governed is an 
important component to successful domestic implementation of international law.  As a result, 
internalization of international norms can only be accomplished through substantively legitimate 
implementation tools.  This process requires extensive consultation with “civil society” in order 
to gain widespread domestic compliance with international norms on the basis of a “logic of 
appropriateness” rather than a “logic of consequences”.   The implication is that citizens will 
comply with international law domestically out of a sense of the normative quality of the rules 
rather than a fear of repercussions for non-compliance. 
1.0 Institutionalism and Implementation of Multilateral Environmental Accords 
 
International law-making relies on the voluntary acceptance of agreements by sovereign states 
and, ultimately, the subjects of the sovereign states.  Negotiated regimes are products of an 
explicit bargaining process in which a number of actors who possess significant, though not 
necessarily equal, bargaining strength reach agreement on the constitutive provisions of an 
 
4 J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
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5institutional arrangement. 5 After these agreements are made, it is up to the parties to implement 
the terms.  Oran Young distinguishes between these two processes as horizontal and vertical 
interplay.  Vertical interplay turns on distinctions among levels of social organization; for 
example, the interaction between governments and their subjects.  On the other hand, horizontal 
interplay emphasizes the importance of differentiating between or among institutions operating at 
the same level.6 An example of this is state to state negotiation.  Professor Koh equally 
recognizes this two-step process explaining that international norms are continually questioned 
and interpreted based on dialogue, first at the institutional, or horizontal, level, and eventually at 
the domestic, or vertical, level.  Koh states:7
Yet such arguments, when made, do not settle the question of international legality.  
Instead, they stimulate another round of transnational legal interaction, in which the 
integrity of the revised norm can be challenged and tested by other nations and 
nongovernmental actions.  The transnational legal process of institutional dialogue 
begins again, starting with a debate over whether to amend or reinterpret the norm in 
light of the new circumstances. 
Usually, successful implementation of international law depends on domestic acceptance.  
Accordingly, transnational legal scholars attempt to reconcile the general aim of international 
governance with the specific instrument choices of domestic governance.  Principally, this is 
done by approaching the transnational legal process as an integrated one involving international 
and domestic actors and institutions.    
Lon Fuller describes, law as “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of 
rules”.8 Oran Young uses the term “governance” to capture the two-stage nature of transnational 
legal process.  Successful governance arrangements are designed to resolve social conflicts, 
promote sustained cooperation and, more generally, alleviate collective-action problems in a 
world of independent actors.   As such, Young points out that at the most general level, 
governance involves the establishment and operation of social institutions that foster dialogue 
 
5 O.R. Young, supra note 2 at 12. 
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6aimed at achieving consensus.  To do this, sets of rules and decision-making procedures serve to 
define social practices and guide the interactions of those participating in these practices.9
Because institutions are significant drivers in causing or confronting environmental change, 
institutionalism is an important tool in studying the horizontal implementation of environmental 
accords. Institutionalism refers to the study of institutional interaction. Institutionalism is 
pragmatic, empirical, and marked by emphasis on “rules in use” in contrast to formal provisions 
of contracts, constitutions, treaties, and other constitutive documents.10 More importantly, it 
focuses on the institutional linkages that bring about successful institutional action.   Long-term 
practices of established “rules in use” lead to an expectation of a continued pattern of 
interrelation between institutions.  If these formal rules or “rules in use” are deviated from, 
implementation will be seen as illegitimate and unsuccessful.  Fuller describes this aptly:11 
Our institutions and our formalized interactions with one another are accompanied 
by certain interlocking expectations that may be called intendments, even though 
there is seldom occasion to bring these underlying expectations across the threshold 
of consciousness. 
In this way, global governance arrangements attempt to establish norms horizontally across 
national boundaries.12 This is principally done through multilateral agreements that use the 
formal rules of international law as well as the “rules in use” to establish and operate an umbrella 
institution that interacts with national governments and other international institutions to achieve 
broad acceptance of the regime at the national institutional level.  CITES is a good example of a 
treaty with broad horizontal participation.    CITES has been ratified by 158 countries.13 
Oran Young sees institutionalism as an important component in studying international 
environmental law.  Of particular importance to evaluating international environmental law is the 
examination of institutional interaction.  Institutions created to deal with specific environmental 
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7problems or issues frequently become embedded in larger hierarchical structures.14 Any effort to 
look at the impact of international environmental agreements will therefore require assessment of 
the larger institutional structures.15 
Indeed, international environmental regimes can only be properly understood as systems of 
rights, rules, and relationships designed to bring order into the interactions of sovereign 
authorities.16 Thus, the process of international environmental regime formation is one of 
negotiation as opposed to a spontaneous, a self-generating, or an imposed regime.17 
MEAs follow Young’s description of institutional operation.  MEAs establish autonomous 
institutional arrangements that mark a distinct approach to: “institutionalized collaboration 
between states, being both more informal and more flexible.”18 MEAs function through a 
hierarchy with the Conference of the Parties (COP) as the supreme body.  Typically, the COP 
will meet on a regular basis to examine the effectiveness of the MEA regime and recommend or 
adopt changes to its operation. The powers of the COP are explicitly set out in treaty articles.19 
Nevertheless, in practice, states are often guided by past member state interaction in interpreting 
MEAs.20 In this way, MEAs exhibit the institutional behaviours described by Young.  Indeed, 
the institutional arrangements of MEAs have become increasingly perceived as crucial to their 
effectiveness.21 Only through properly functioning institutions can MEAs adapt to changing 
circumstances in environmental problems.22 Institutional interaction is therefore the dominant 
feature of horizontal implementation of international environmental law.   
However, this represents only half of the process.  Environmental norms must also be 
implemented in a vertical manner within nation-states.  Professor Harold Koh maintains that this 
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8means that various state and non-state actors must work together to “internalize” international 
norms domestically.23 In order to achieve this, the norms must be grounded deep within national 
political, economic and cultural systems if they are to achieve their purposes.24 Central to the 
success of such grounding is the legitimacy of the vertical process.   
2.3 Vertical Implementation of Multilateral Environmental Accords 
The integrated approach of institutionalism is concerned with institutional linkages at the 
domestic and international levels.  By examining the linkages, the “rules in use” that are practiced 
among institutions become apparent.  It can then be determined what conditions are required for a 
given institution (such as a member state government) to adopt an international environmental 
convention. However, successful implementation of international environmental conventions 
requires domestic implementation.  This vertical process is best understood by transnational legal 
process which involves state and non-state actors working to successfully “internalize” 
international environmental norms at the domestic level.  Legitimacy at this stage does not 
depend on whether a rule or decision is substantively correct as much as whether it reflects 
general support for a given policy.25 Transnational legal process is described by Harold Hongju 
Koh as:26 
…the theory and practice of how public and private actors – nation-states, 
international organizations, multinational enterprises, non-governmental 
organizations and private individuals interact in a variety of ways to make, interpret, 
enforce and ultimately internalize rules of transnational law.    
Professor Koh defines the transnational process of making international law as an integrated one 
focusing on the actions of several state and non-state actors.  The process may be identified 
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9temporally as a four-step progression, which I characterize as27: enactment, interpretation, 
enforcement and internalization.   
The first step sees institutions at the international level adopt international environmental 
conventions.  The second and third steps in the transnational legal process involve nations subject 
to the international agreement interpreting their obligations under the treaty and enacting laws, 
regulations, or voluntary programs to induce changes in private party conduct in order to ensure 
compliance with the treaty obligations.  This process is best understood by the institutional 
analysis described above.  
The fourth stage of transnational legal process, internalization, involves private parties in the 
specific states changing their conduct in response to the national actions.  This stage or step is 
focused on the interaction of state and non-state actors to develop a common understanding of the 
legal norms represented by the international obligation.  When this occurs, national and 
international non-state (and largely non-institutional) actors will campaign to have domestic 
governments adhere to the obligations.  Further, governments, in which there is a strong 
internalization of international environmental norms, will pressure the minority to adhere to 
norms broadly accepted by the domestic population.28 
Once institutions have accepted, through ratification, the international norms imposed on them 
through negotiated regimes formed through legitimate processes using both formal rules and 
“rules in use”, these institutions must then focus on their subjects’ acceptance of the norms in 
order to successfully internalize them.  Two ways of thinking dominate: the logic of 
consequences and the logic of appropriateness.29 
Those who embrace the logic of consequences assume that the actors are utilitarians who will 
change their behaviour when it becomes in their best interest to do so.  In other words, utilitarian 
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actors will comply with rules and fulfill commitments if, and only if, they are convinced that the 
present value of compliance exceeds the value of non-compliance.30 
Conversely, those who adhere to the logic of appropriateness assume that actors behave in ways 
that they regard as right or proper and that they will normally accept restrictions that they 
conceive as legitimate.  Governments approaching the problem from this perspective will seek to 
design arrangements that actors treat as authoritative because their voices were heard in the 
design process or because they are based on underlying principles that actors regard as fair or 
just.  To the extent that rules are accepted as legitimate or authoritative, those whose actions are 
governed by the “logic of appropriateness” rather than the “logic of consequences” will comply 
with the rules without making an effort to calculate whether the benefits of doing so outweigh the 
costs.31 Thus, some international environmental regimes apply mechanisms that will increase the 
benefits of compliance or raise the costs of non-compliance to member states while others rely on 
feelings of propriety or development of behaviour.  Many political science scholars see 
legitimacy as the basis for obedience based on the “logic of appropriateness”.  For example, 
Grace Skogstad states:32 
It is the combination of input legitimacy – that is, procedural legitimacy – and 
output legitimacy – that is, substantive legitimacy – that leads individuals to feel a 
sense of obligation to obey collectively binding decisions even when they conflict 
with their own preferences.   
By and large, transnational legal scholars have also accepted that successful implementation of 
international environmental norms requires institutional frameworks that rely on the logic of 
appropriateness for compliance. Moreover, many environmentalists see logic of appropriateness 
as the only means of ensuring enduring environmental protection.  For example, Carol Rose 
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advocates a changing of norms to see the environment as a “gift” which can be protected best by 
voluntary self-restraint.33 
This was a concept articulated by Immanuel Kant in The Conflict of the Faculties in which he 
writes:34 
The profit which will accrue to the human race as it works its way forward will not 
be an ever-increasing quantity of morality in its attitudes.  Instead, the legality of its 
attitudes will produce an increasing number of actions governed by duty, whatever 
the particular motive behind these actions may be…Violence will gradually become 
less on the part of those in power, and obedience towards the laws will 
increase…and this will ultimately extend to the external relations between the 
various peoples, until a cosmopolitan society is created. 
 Given this, it is not unreasonable to assert that legal regimes accepted on the basis of a logic of 
appropriateness are seen as more legitimate than those that rely on a logic of consequences.   
2.4 Legitimacy as Consent 
 
According to William Connolly35, Max Weber’s definition of legitimacy provides the starting 
point for any contemporary discussion of legitimacy.  Weber concludes there are three alternative 
claims to legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, and legal.36 Legitimacy may reside in an appeal to 
tradition or the established belief in the sanctity of long-established traditions and the legitimacy 
of those exercising authority under them. Legitimacy may equally be founded on charisma.  This 
is the devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual 
person and the “normative patterns of order revealed or ordained by him”37. Finally, a claim 
might appeal to rational procedures or a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of 
 
33 C. M. Rose, “Given-ness and Gift” (1994), 24 Environmental Law 1 at 17.  
34 I. Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, excerpted in Kant’s Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Press, 1982) at 132.  
35 W. Connolly, “Legitimacy and Modernity” in Legitimacy and the State (W. Connolly ed.) (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1984) at 8. 
36 M. Weber, “Legitimacy, Politics and the State” in Connolly, Id at 34. 
37 M. Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) at 215 as cited in 
Connolly, supra note 36. 
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those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.  In a liberal democracy, 
legitimacy of governmental action is judged primarily on these latter terms.  At a minimum, 
legitimacy entails government action that is consistent with the rule of law.  The rule of law 
entails subjection of subjects to known legal rules and executive accountability to the legal 
authority.38 However, even among committed legal positivists, a normative evaluation of a legal 
regime goes beyond mere legislation.39 Legitimacy in the broader sense must demonstrate some 
form of consent to the authority.  Indeed, Daniel Bodansky states that all modern theories of 
legitimacy attempt to base governmental authority on the consent of the governed.40 Central to 
this normative evaluation of law as consent is both a rights evaluation and a contractualist one.   
Rights theory is based on the belief that certain natural rights exist which are inviolable.41 The 
theory is premised on the age-old belief that an immoral law is no law at all.42 In the modern 
sense, according to Hohfeld’s widely accepted definition, a right is a legal claim that can be 
asserted against others, including, where relevant, the prevailing governmental power.43 Rights 
holders may act as they choose within the scope of the right, regardless of the practical result.  
Further, many liberal democratic states today have a written Bill of Rights which set out certain 
inviolable rights that cannot be infringed by government action.  Thus, even if laws are passed in 
accordance with the “Diceyan”44 conception of the rule of law, they cannot be valid if they 
breach fundamental rights outlined in a written Bill of Rights. 
 
38 Re: Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 at 730. 
39 Murphy and Coleman, Philosophy of Law, (Boulder: Westview, 1990) at 69.  
40 D. Bodansky, supra note 26 at 597. 
41 see for example, Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, (T. P. Peardon ed.), (New York: Macmillan, 1952) at 
79. 
42 see for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica [First Part of the Second Part] The Essence of Law, as 
reproduced in D. Bigongiari, The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas, (New York: Hafner Press, 1953) at 7. 
43 J. Singer, “The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld” (1982), Wisc. Law 
Rev. 975 at 986. 
44 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of Law of the Constitution, (London: McMillian, 1975) at 187-199 (the 
Diceyan conception of the rule of law was that relied on and summarized by the Supreme Court of Canada in its 
definition of the “rule of law”, in Manitoba Language Rights, supra note 39). 
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Contractual theory has its roots in Thomas Hobbes45 and Jean Jacques Rousseau46. Locke 
expressed it as: 47 
Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can 
be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his 
consent.  The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty and 
puts on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into 
a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, 
in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security against any that are 
not of it.   
Thus, according to contractual theory, government is a compact freely consented to by the people 
acting in their own self-interest for self-preservation.  John Rawls used consent to a social 
contract as a legitimizing principle most recently.48 For Rawls, consensus around a liberal 
conception of justice is the only viable basis for a stable union in modern democratic societies, 
which are characterized by what he calls the “fact of pluralism”.  As citizens have, and will 
continue to have, competing comprehensive moral conceptions that involve different convictions 
about that which makes life valuable and the moral theories that ground such beliefs, a common 
consensus must be reached for liberal democracy to remain viable.   
Like Max Weber, Rawls saw three possible bases of social union (or basis of consent to 
authority).  First, there could be some universal acceptance of some particular comprehensive 
moral doctrine.  Rawls sees this as unrealistic given the pluralistic nature of the modern liberal 
democratic state.  Second is self-interest.  Like Hobbes, Rawls saw a possible basis of legitimacy 
to be a pragmatic one in which citizens submit to authority and social union on the basis of need.  
However, Rawls rejects this as too temporary in nature.  Once the conditions that brought on the 
consent shift, the legitimacy of the authority will be questioned.  The third basis of consent Rawls 
recognizes is the overlapping consensus around a political conception of justice.  This will be a 
 
45 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, (London: Penguin Classics, 1968) at 236. 
46 J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, (London: Penguin Classics, 1968) at 59. 
47 J. Locke, supra note 42 at 54. 
48 J. Rawls, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus” (1987), 7 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1at 1. 
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narrow enough conception of the good to ensure the long-term viability of the legitimacy of 
authority and is less prone to desertion when it is to one party’s advantage.     
The notion of legitimacy as consent is important to transnational legal process.  Internalization 
requires that subjects act out of a logic of appropriateness.  This cannot be achieved in legal 
regimes that are imposed rather than consensual.  As such, domestic implementation cannot occur 
in violation of citizens’ rights and it must be consistent with the social compact that is the 
foundation of the domestic regime. However, as will be explained below, these theories of 
legitimate governance have been criticized as incomplete because they fail to take into account 
the role of community in citizens’ perceptions of legitimacy.49 
2.5 Transnational Legal Process and the Role of Legitimacy 
 
The role of legitimacy in transnational legal process is different in the two main stages of the 
transnational legal process.  The horizontal stage is mainly concerned with procedural legitimacy.  
Nevertheless, legitimate implementation procedures at the horizontal level are important to the 
successful internalization of the legal norms represented by international environmental 
conventions.  At the horizontal stage of transnational legal process, legitimacy depends on 
adopting conventions that are negotiated in a manner consistent with both the formal rules and 
the “rules in use” that have evolved over years of institutional interaction.   
Thomas M. Franck sees legitimacy as rule by laws.  Frank cites four indicators of legitimacy:50 
determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence.  Determinacy means the law is 
defined and public so that everyone may understand his or her obligations.  Symbolic validation 
is a sense that authority is being exercised in accordance with the right process that is 
institutionally recognized and validated. People who have not acquired authority through the 
proper rituals cannot be seen as legitimately exercising power. Coherence implies that a rule be 
applied uniformly in every similar or applicable instance.  Adherence implies that all laws be 
 
49 Infra, p. 19. 
50 T. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 30-46. 
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made with the proper procedure in accordance with what H.L.A. Hart calls secondary rules of 
recognition.51 
Although Harold Koh maintains that internalization may occur in both liberal and non-liberal 
regimes, it is more likely to occur in liberal states.52 Moreover, as recognized by Robert 
Keohane, liberal regimes offer the transparency within the political-institutional environment that 
is necessary for the interaction, which brings about internalization. 53 
Legitimate process is necessary for developing a logic of appropriateness.  If a regime has a legal 
system where law is enacted, and power exercised, legitimately (as defined by Franck), the 
conditions deemed necessary by Keohane to internalize international law will be present.  Koh 
notes that legal compliance in the domestic arena is a function of encouraging internalized 
normative behaviour. 54 Similarly, Thomas Franck defines legitimacy in the international domain 
as a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on 
those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come 
into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.55 
Finally, Oran Young says the perceived equity of a solution will be entrenched when major 
parties and interest groups have a sense that their primary concerns have been treated as a critical 
determinant for successful efforts to create international rules.56 Legitimacy, according to 
Young, depends on the extent to which those addressed by a rule see themselves as obligated by 
it and on whether that attitude of obligation is conditioned by the quality of the rules and not by 
the power that created and supports them.  Since it is only when international law is implemented 
domestically that people become obligated to follow it, legitimacy looms large in horizontal 
 
51 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) at 209. 
52 R. O. Keohane, supra note 28 at 710-711; Koh himself admits that “the structural attributes of liberal systems 
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Law Home” (1998), 35 Houston Law Review 623 at 676. 
53 R.O. Keohane, supra note 28 at 710. 
54 H.H. Koh, supra note 53 at 628. 
55 T. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 24, 38. 
56 O. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1989) at 368. 
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implementation but implies a deeper meaning at the vertical stage.  Central to legitimacy at the 
vertical stage of transnational legal process is the impact an international norm has on political 
communities. 
1.0 Community and Legitimacy 
 
At the vertical stage of transnational legal process, legitimacy takes on a greater importance and 
is integral to successful internalization of international environmental norms. Again, the quality 
of the rules will be evaluated before subjects will obey a law based on logic of appropriateness.  
It is at this stage that member states attempt to internalize international environmental norms in 
such a way that the citizens will comply with the rules without making an effort to calculate 
whether the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.  An important appeal to legitimacy in 
vertical implementation of international norms is community.  Franck states:57 
The more plausible a community’s perception of a rule’s legitimacy, the more 
persuasive that rule’s claim to fairness, the stronger its promotion of compliance, 
and the firmer its re-enforcement of the sense of community. 
Essentially, our community determines who we are; it is the context in which we exist and which 
gives meaning to our actions.58 Michael Sandel states:59 
…to say that members of society are bound by a sense of community is not simply 
to say that a great many of them profess communitarian sentiments and pursue 
communitarian aims, but rather that they conceive their identity-the subject and not 
just the object of their feelings and aspirations- as defined to some extent by the 
community of which they are a part.  For them, community describes not just what 
they have as fellow citizens but also what they are, not a relationship they choose (as 
in voluntary association) but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but 
a constituent of their identity.   
Thus, communitarian arguments reject the idea that individuals are an aggregation of identifiable 
preferences that exist prior to, or apart from, any group.  Instead, citizens form preferences with 
 
57 T. Franck, supra note 51 at 30; see also T. Franck, supra note 56 at 38 where Franck notes that legitimacy is an 
avenue to obligation as well as perceived justness of the regime. 
58 M. J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) at 150, 183. 
59 Id at 150. 
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reference to that community as well as by traditional modes of political action.  Franck 
demonstrates community’s impact on citizens’ understanding of legitimacy with this remark:60 
It is only by reference to a community’s evolving standards of what constitutes right 
process that it is possible to assert meaningfully that a law, or an executive order, or 
a court’s judgment, or a citizen’s claim on a compatriot, or a government’s claim on 
a citizen is legitimate.   
When domestic implementation of international law is undertaken, the same institutions whose 
representatives negotiated an agreement with other states to commit to a certain undertaking 
become subject to a greater degree of scrutiny.  This is because the vertical implementation (and 
eventual internalization) of international norms involves much more interaction with non-
institutional actors.  Implementation procedures at this level must be cognizant of the 
community’s values and perceptions in order to successfully internalize the norms.   The 
dichotomy between the expectations at the two stages is captured in Charles Taylor’s description 
of a community’s identification with its institutions.  Taylor notes:61 
On the one hand, there are structures that have a merely instrumental relation to our 
lives, even if the service they supply is very important.  On the other hand, there are 
environments characterized by practices that are the primary sites in which we 
define important values and hence possible poles of identity.  We may speak of 
institutions that serve versus institutions that identify.  All are institutions in our 
society, but the respective ways they fit into our lives are very different. 
As institutions become part of individuals’ lives, they come to give the community meaning.  
Thus, at the vertical stage, institutional structures have different components, which help in 
specifying the interests that motivate action: norms, identity, knowledge, and culture.62 
Nevertheless, institutions (and the communities they represent) can be reshaped through changes 
 
60 T. Franck, supra note 51 at 26. 
61 C. Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993) at 123. 
62 J. Brunnée & S. Toope , “International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of 
International Law” (2000), 39 Colum. J. Trans. L. 19 at 29. 
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in the constructed identities of the actors.63 Skogstad takes note of the malleable nature of 
legitimacy stating:64 
While legitimation standards differ across societies and over time, output legitimacy generally 
captures the belief that decisions and policy outcomes promote the common welfare of the 
political community through effective problem-solving and distributive justice. 
In consenting to international norms, a government binds itself.  However, implementation of 
international law, in particular environmental law, has significant implications for, and imposes 
obligations on, non-state actors and requires their consent in order to be successful.   Thus, an 
important component of legitimacy is consent.  Consent implies action consistent with the rights 
of citizens and action consistent with the social contract.  Also important in legitimacy is action 
consistent with community values.  In order to successfully implement international law 
domestically, a given community must accept it as just and right.  Only then will non-institutional 
actors voluntarily change their behaviours based on a logic of appropriateness.  Legitimate 
procedures allow norms to emerge:65 
…from the interaction of participants (subjects), and an increasingly fixed pattern of expectations 
about appropriate behaviour. 
Internalization of norms occurs when citizens adopt the norms at a deep level.  Where this occurs, 
subjects will obey laws out of a “logic of appropriateness” rather than a “logic of consequences”.  
The difference is explained well by Skogstad:66 
…it is helpful to recognize that legitimacy has both an input and output component.  Political 
authority enjoys input legitimacy when individuals believe that those who make legally 
enforceable decisions have a right to do so. In democracies, input legitimacy is sourced in 
procedures that allow citizen preferences to enter into the political process.  Political authority 
enjoys output legitimacy when the outputs of governing – public policies and other decisions – 
meet social standards of acceptability and appropriateness. 
 
63 Id at 30. 
64 G. Skogstad, supra note 33 at 956. 
65 Id at 24. 
66 G. Skogstad, supra note 33 at 956. 
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Thus, implementation of MEAs cannot occur without legitimate implementation procedures.   
Since legitimacy is based on consent, implementation of international legal norms cannot be seen 
as being imposed on a particular community.  In particular, those communities represented by the 
constituent governmental institutions within the nation-state in a federation must consent to the 
domestic implementation of international legal norms.   Consent is obtained domestically through 
both a rights-based and a compact theory of legitimate governance.  The following chapter will 
show that these theories are readily applicable to federalism as sub-units’ consent is obtained 
through procedures that are consistent both with the rights of sub-units and procedures that 
respect the historical compact of the federal regime.          
3.0 Legitimacy in the Canadian Federal State  
3.1 Normative Federalism 
In the struggle for an equilibrium between individual and communal  
rights, there are no guarantees for success, at least in the short term. Ultimately, 
therefore, as consent of the governed remains the basic  
principle, the disappointed or disillusioned citizen must have the right  
to voluntarily seek his or her community elsewhere.67 
In a federal state, a large portion of the population identifies itself with the communities within 
the sub-units of the federation.  Moreover, the citizen is free to “seek his or her community 
elsewhere”.  As a result, community and community identification with institutions is particularly 
relevant in a federal state.  Consequently, domestic implementation of MEAs in federal states 
must be done in a manner that is consistent with federal normative values.  Although I will not 
attempt to elucidate a complete theory of federalism through a normative lens, I will attempt to 
demonstrate one of the primary means by which citizens in a federal state (in particular, Canada) 
evaluate the legitimacy of government action.  This will generally parallel transnational legal 
process.  The use of international models to understand policy-making in the federal context is 
 
67 P.W. Hutchins, "The Aboriginal Right to self-government and the Canadian Constitution: The Ghost in the 
Machine" (1995), 29 U.B.C. L. Rev. 251 at 298. 
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not uncommon.68 When applying international models of governance within federal states, the 
term multilevel governance is used.69 Like transnational legal process, the focus of multilevel 
governance is on the relationship between established institutions.  Determinations are made 
between these institutions about what level should undertake policy implementation based on 
what resources are available at each level, and the ability of the governments to carry out policy 
in an efficient manner.70 
Because of the interaction between the institutions, the institutionalism theory used to explain 
patterns of behaviour among international states becomes useful. The federal government must 
implement international environmental agreements in a manner that is consistent with the formal 
federal contract as well as the “rules in use” that underlie the political relations between federal 
sub-units and the national government.  However, this institutional interaction must also be 
consistent with Canadians’ understanding of the federal values of the Canadian polity.  The 
essence of the characterization of the international legal system as “horizontal” is that there is no 
legislative or executive hierarchy within the system.71 As a result:72 
Norms typically emerge from the interaction between participants (subjects), and 
an increasingly fixed pattern of expectations about appropriate behaviour. 
However, an important feature of multilevel governance is that often a federal government can 
impose its will on the constituent units whereas the international dimension of global governance 
is purely consensual.  Nevertheless, this “horizontal” view of federalism is a useful tool in 
understanding the ultimate vertical implementation of environmental norms in a federation and 
the concomitant internalization of those norms. 
 
68 See for example, J. O. Saunders, “Sharing Environmental Management: A Legal Perspective”, (Paper presented at 
the International Conference on Environmental Management: The Sharing of Responsibilities between Levels of 
Government, Lac Beauport, Quebec, 4-6 December 1992) [unpublished] 
69 R. O’Brien, “The Nuances of Multilevel and Global Governance”, paper presented at Globalization, Multilevel 
Governance and Democracy: Continental, Comparative and Global Perspectives, (Kingston: Queen’s University, 
May 3-4, 2002) at 3. 
70 Id at 4. 
71 J. Brunnée & S. Toope, supra note 63 at 21. 
72 Id at 21. 
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An understanding of the normative values of federalism will aid in setting standards with which 
we can we assess, evaluate, justify, defend or attack the structure and operation of the federal 
system and the implementation of MEAs within it.   The first step in this examination is to define 
the main basis of legitimacy relevant to federalism.  Legitimacy has been defined as: authority 
exercised consistent with right process; power exercised without breaching the natural rights of 
the governed; and authority based on a social contract.  All of these are normative bases for 
federalism and consent is the thread that runs through them.   When speaking of consent in the 
federal milieu, consent is not conceived of as the consent of the individual governed but rather of 
the political communities making up the federation. 
Legitimate government is consensual.  Just as international environmental regimes can only be 
properly understood as systems of rights, rules, and relationships designed to bring order into the 
interactions of sovereign authorities,73 federal regimes exhibit many of the same characteristics.  
To a large degree, federal-provincial environmental regime formation in Canada is, like 
international regime formation, one of negotiation rather than a spontaneous, a self-generating or 
an imposed regime.74 In the context of Canadian environmental policy, to a larger degree than in 
many federations, environmental regime formation is largely a consensual process.  The history 
of Canadian federalism and the “rules in use” that have developed over years of federal-
provincial diplomacy require the implementation of negotiated regimes in order to effectively 
implement policy, especially environmental policy.   
Legitimacy in a federal system is concomitantly based on rights, contract, and process.  Again, 
the central theme in these bases of legitimacy is consent.  In order for the polities in a federation 
to consent to union, the union must have some justification.  Richard Simeon lists the 
justifications for federal governance as: effectiveness, community, and democracy.75 The 
perspective of effectiveness justifies an action by a constituent or national level of government 
where it will enhance the capacity of government institutions to generate effective policy and 
 
73 Much like international environmental legal regime as described by O. Young, supra note 2 at 7. 
74 Id at 11. 
75 R. E. Simeon, supra note 79. 
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respond to citizen needs.  The federal principle of community justifies the exercise of authority 
from the level of government that best represents the community affected. Moreover, it will 
appeal to the image of the ideal or preferred community that that constituency represents.  
Finally, the democracy justification is used to attempt to legitimize federal or provincial actions 
by demonstrating that the exercise of power by that level of government promotes democracy.  A 
national government will appeal to majority support in the nation-state as a whole to justify its 
authority.  A state or provincial government, on the other hand, will try to demonstrate that its 
legitimacy to oppose national authority is based on the fact that a majority within its borders is 
opposed to the imposition of federal authority and maintain that action by the national 
government is an illegitimate use of federal power because it will be a manifestation of the 
tyranny of the majority that federalism is intended to prevent.76 
The justification I will be focusing on is community, which is particularly relevant to the 
Canadian federal system,77and is central to successful implementation of international law 
domestically. The legitimacy of federal action is therefore assessed by its ability to successfully 
maintain a balance between the provincial and national communities.  Thomas Franck, while 
recognizing the social contract theories of philosophers such as Rawls, makes a similar claim: 78 
While most literature about the social contract addresses the formation of a 
community by persons, contractarian theory is also readily applicable to, and 
influential in, the evolution of a community of states. 
A federal system is one of dual sovereignty.  Both the federal and regional governments are 
sovereign in particular spheres of governance and independent of one another.79 Each 
government has a constitutional right to legislate in its particular sphere.  Therefore, a normative 
 
76 See for example A. Hamilton, J. Jay, J. Madison, The Federalist Papers, Federalist No. 10, (New York: New 
American Library, 1961) esp. Federalist Paper No. 39. 
77 Simeon, supra note 79 at 135-136. 
78 T. Franck, supra note 56 at 26-27. 
79 K.C. Wheare, Federal government, (4th ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) at 14. 
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understanding of federalism can be partially explained through a rights analysis.  Lynn Baker and 
Ernst Young define the rights as: 80 
A state's freedom from federal interference, like an individual's freedom from 
governmental restrictions on expression or private choices, is an essentially 
negative freedom. Just as Isaiah Berlin defined "negative freedom" for individuals 
as "the area in which a man can act unobstructed by others,"81 so too federalism 
seeks to create a space within which a local political community can make 
choices about how to govern itself without interference from the national 
government. And just as negative freedoms do not prescribe what the individual 
shall do within this protected sphere of liberty, so too federalism does not dictate 
that the state government make any particular substantive choice within the range 
of options permitted it. 
However, one cannot make a direct comparison between the rights of individuals and legitimate 
governmental action, discussed above, and the rights of federal sub-units. The rights held by 
federal sub-units have no independent value; their worth derives entirely from their utility in 
enhancing the freedom and welfare of individuals.82 The question is: 83 
…whether individual freedom can best be protected solely by assigning particular 
rights to individuals -- such as free speech or privacy -- or through a structure of 
institutional checks and balances, or through some combination of the two.  
This is a common reason for adopting a federal system.  Political philosophers from Aristotle to 
Montesquieu insisted that political units had to stay relatively small, because only a small polity 
could possess sufficient social and moral commonality to be self-governing.84 Although James 
Madison argued that a large national government could more effectively control the tendency 
toward faction in popular governments,85 he also insisted that the jurisdiction of the central 
government be limited with the states and localities retaining control over matters within their 
 
80 L. Baker & E. Young, “Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review”(2001), 51 Duke L.J. 75 at 135-
136. 
81 I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty 122 (1969) as cited in L. Baker & E. Young, id at 135. 
82 L. Baker & E. Young, supra note 88 at 136. 
83 Id at 136. 
84 W. M. McClay “The Soul of Man Under Federalism” (1996), 64 First Things 21 at 23. Of course the idea that 
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85 A. Hamilton, J. Jay and J. Madison, supra note 84 at 77. 
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traditional authority.86 Madison assumed that a large and diverse nation could not offer the same 
sense of moral community as a small and relatively homogeneous republic.87 Thus, at its core, 
the federal system can be understood as the integration of political communities that share a 
common population.   
In Canada, the federal dynamic is marked by the interaction not between individuals but between 
what have been called political communities. Political communities have aspects of affective 
communities, which consist of mutual attachments through personal contact and day-to-day 
relationships.88 Further, they are also dialogic communities, which emphasize the instrumental 
role of public debate and un-coerced persuasion in arriving at collective decision-making (i.e. 
legitimate decision making).89 
The political community, in the traditional sense of the term, has no geographic centre.90 Rather, 
it is a community of common interests and/or identities.  More importantly, identification or 
membership in a political community is freely given, unlike membership in a nation-state.  The 
form of the political community is therefore constantly in flux.  It continually changes as new 
projects or joint actions are undertaken.91 
The presence of political communities within the nation-state is particularly relevant with respect 
to ethnic minorities within the broader dominant culture.  However, the values may also be based 
on traditional ways of life or economic structure that create differences among otherwise 
homogenous federal states.  Thomas Franck asserts that allegiance to political communities may 
be based not on ethnic, language or religious divisions but on an: 92 
Ineluctable conflict between two principles which had been conceived not in 
integrum but in very limited, specific historic contexts.  
 
86 Id at 291. 
87 Id at 290. 
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For example, the American Civil War was largely fought to bring the southern states back into 
the union.  The Confederacy saw secession as the only means to preserve its traditional plantation 
economy in the face of a federal government seemingly dedicated to destroying its economic 
base – cotton production supported by slave labour.  Although a great number of southerners had 
no direct interest in it, this economic system was so integral to the south that it essentially defined 
the region.  As one historian notes:93 
What we are dealing with here is a culture complex.  Despite the fact that cotton 
growing and slaveholding directly involved only a minority, it was nevertheless 
true that standards, conditions, and patterns of society were set by the basic staple. 
Similarly, the imposition of the federal National Energy Policy94 in Canada by the federal 
government was seen as an attack on the traditional resource economy of Alberta and thereby 
viewed as illegitimate despite its constitutional validity.95 Just as cotton was to the American 
south, the oil and gas industry in Alberta is seen as a defining feature of the society. The 
Canadian sociologist John F. Conway sees the Canadian west as a whole as a region defined by a 
resource economy marked by:96 
…structural economic inequality, built into the very fabric of the national economy, 
combines with the inevitable insecurity that haunts resource-based economies, to 
sustain an ongoing sense of injustice in the West.  Western disaffection, and its 
continuing expression in increasingly regional politics, is the defensive reaction of 
the people of the West who have fought repeatedly for structural changes, only to be 
defeated each time.         
Specifically, the citizens of the respective state and provincial governments viewed both of these 
federal actions as a breach of the self-determination inherent in the federal value of community.  
Both situations were an affront to what the people thought was the federal principle that allows 
the government closest to them to make decisions about particular local issues.  In these cases, 
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the resource economy and the cotton economy were deemed to be essential to the communities 
and particular to the region.  As such, the citizens believed the only legitimate use of power was 
by the constituent government itself, or at least with their consultation. 
Thus, democratic claims to legitimacy in a federal system are often appeals to community values. 
This legitimacy depends on using mechanisms which are consistent both with federal democratic 
values, in that they are constitutionally valid and, in a broader sense, are not a manifestation of 
the tyranny of the majority over a discrete political community.  As a final example, I would 
point to the imposition of the Charter of Rights in Canada. Legally, the federal government was 
in a position to patriate the new Constitution Act, 198297 (which included the Charter of Rights)
absent provincial consent.98 The Charter was eventually adopted with the approval of all 
provinces except Quebec.  Indeed, for several years after, all laws passed in Quebec were passed 
“notwithstanding”99 the provisions of the Charter in protest of this federal use of authority.   
However, it could not be said the people of Quebec did not accept the principles of the Charter.  
The Quebec government implemented a Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms100,
which provides the same protections as the federal Charter.  Nevertheless, the Charter is deemed 
illegitimate by Quebeckers because it is perceived to have been imposed by the federal 
government on the people of Quebec in spite of the opposition of the provincial government, an 
illegitimate use of authority because it is a breach of the federalist goal of protecting political 
communities. 101 
Contractual understandings of legitimacy are equally, if not more important than, rights-based 
conceptions of legitimacy in a federation.  The federal framework is recognized as having the 
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nature of a state system safeguarded by an effective coercive legal apparatus such as the federal 
Constitution.  In this way, it is understood as a contract, generating the members’ consensus as 
the base of the system.102 The American Senator John C. Calhoon stated:103 
…the present constitution is the act of States themselves, which is the same thing 
as the people of the several States, and forms a union of them as sovereign 
communities…the confederation was a contract between agents-the present 
Constitution a contract between the principals themselves. 
The words of the Supreme Court of Canada make this point particularly clear in the Canadian 
context:104 
The federal character of the Canadian Constitution was recognized in innumerable 
judicial pronouncements.  We will quote only one, that of Lord Watson in 
Liquidators of Maritime Bank v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick:105 
The object of the Act was neither to weld the provinces into one, nor to 
subordinate provincial governments to a central authority, but to create a federal 
government in which they should all be represented, entrusted with the exclusive 
administration of affairs in which they had a common interest, each province 
retaining its independence and autonomy. 
The federal principle cannot be reconciled with a state of affairs where the 
modification of provincial legislative powers could be obtained by the unilateral 
action of the federal authorities.  
Similarly, Immanuel Kant in Perpetual Peace (1795)106 envisioned a pact between nations 
binding each and every one of them to certain rules in order to overcome the defects generated by 
state sovereignty.  According to Kant, nations make war because they find themselves in a state 
of nature and the transition to political society, which worked for people within individual 
countries, must be extended to nations.  
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Finally, Wayne Norman uses the contractualist approach as well and recommends, as does Rawls 
for society generally, that federal principles and institutions be judged as if they were selected by 
enlightened federal partners interested in developing a stable, mutually beneficial federation in 
the long-term.  Norman’s theory, like modern contractual theories applying to unitary states and 
their citizens, maintains that it is irrelevant in the first instance whether there actually was a 
contract but when evaluating the institutions we must look at historical pacts, treaties and 
tradition.  History can serve, according to LaSelva:107 
…as a reminder, if not a solution.  What it suggests is that the very existence of 
Canada has depended on the willingness to compromise, the recognition of 
difference, and the willingness to create a community of belonging that seeks to 
include all Canadians.  Much the same idea is expressed by saying that if Canada is 
to exist at all, it must exist as a federal and pluralistic nation. 
The task, according to Norman, is to sketch the basic normative structure starting from the 
situation of independent nations negotiating to form a just and stable federation. Applying such a 
general theory to an actual federation will involve balancing its recommendations with the moral 
force of historical arguments. 108 
Although no agreement exists on what a just federation is, Norman believes that a consensus can 
be built, at a minimum, on the definition of an unjust federation.  Norman includes in this: the 
perception by the citizens of any sub-unit that it is unfairly disadvantaged in the federation or that 
it is underrepresented in key federal institutions; mutual lack of understanding among citizens 
and political elites of different regions or provinces of each others’ political, economic, or 
cultural situation; divergent perceptions of the history or prehistory of the federation; mutual 
distrust concerning the use of federal institutions; resentment by one group, that forms a national 
minority but is represented by a sub-unit in which the group is a majority, concerning the 
treatment of its people.109 
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The way to avoid the perception of an unjust federation is to base it on the normative quality of 
trust.110 According to Daniel Weinstock, the central government can encourage trust among the 
members and representatives of groups assembled within the same society at the national level. 
Citizens of sub-units must not perceive that the federal government is posing threats to the 
interests that distinguish them from the nation as a whole. Through the federalist system, groups 
will generate a common political identity that will, in turn, foster the achievement of social values 
and goals on a national scale.   
Samuel LaSelva uses a similar concept of fraternity to describe the normative values of 
federalism.  Political communities unite to allow different ways of life to flourish but also come 
together to promote the good of all.  While fraternity does not demand complete identity of 
sentiments and interest, it does suppose that peoples with distinctive ways of life can possess 
goodwill towards each other, participate in common endeavours, develop and sustain common 
allegiances and common sentiments, and, most importantly, operate political institutions for the 
welfare of all.111 
Essentially, the subject of a federal state is what David Held would call the “cosmopolitan” 
citizen.112 Held posits that the citizen in the modern liberal-democratic state has several 
allegiances to various communities.  Indeed Charles Taylor has commented that Canada can only 
operate if such cosmopolitanism is respected.  Taylor notes:113 
To build a country for everyone, Canada would have to allow for second-level or deep diversity, 
where a plurality of ways of belonging would also be acknowledged and accepted.    
The long-term survival of a federation is therefore dependant on an appeal to the normative 
qualities of the system and the ability it offers its citizens to belong to several different 
communities under one government.  It cannot be based solely on the utilitarian benefits of union.  
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Accordingly, a sense of obligation based on the appropriateness of international environmental 
norms, and a fortiori, internalization, will only emerge in a federal state where a sense of 
legitimacy exists in the implementation of the norms in the sub-units. This is particularly the case 
in some provinces of Canada.  There is a national community (those who hold primary allegiance 
to the Canadian state) and separate provincial communities (those who hold primary allegiance to 
their province).  However, the degree of bifurcation varies from province to province and over 
time.  As Andrew Petter states: 114 
The underlying rationale for federalism is a belief that while some matters are 
better decided by the national political community, others should be left to the 
regional political communities.  Implicit in this belief is that, with respect to certain 
matters, regional governments can better reflect the political attitudes and 
aspirations of citizens.  
Indeed, in Canada, all provinces have significant provincial communities except Ontario.115 
However, as the national and provincial political communities have a common population, there 
is significant overlap in allegiances.  Norrie, Simeon and Krasnick note:116 
There is overwhelming public-opinion evidence to show that citizens do not view their 
community identifications in an either/or way; they feel comfortable as Canadians and 
also as citizens of a province…Canadians are indeed “good federalists”.  They share 
multiple loyalties; they value both Canada and their province, and they do not see a 
conflict or contradiction in holding these identities simultaneously.   
It is my assertion that the cosmopolitan citizen has always existed in federal states with 
allegiances to the federal or constituent government fluctuating based on his or her understanding 
of the value of federalism generally and the specific federal values of his or her broader nation-
state.  Accordingly, government action in a federal state will only be legitimate if it successfully 
appeals to two notions.  First, citizens must accept government authority on the basis of 
 
114 A. Petter, “Federalism and the Myth of Federal Spending Power” (1989), 68 Canadian Bar Review 448 at 464. 
115 See R. Gibbins, “Regional Politics”, in Politics: Canada, (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1987) at 196 where 
the author notes that surveys reveal that for Canada as a whole, 74% choose Canada as their first loyalty and 26% 
their province.  Ontario was at the low end with only 5% identifying with their province and Newfoundland had the 
highest provincial identification at 58%. 
116 K. Norrie, R. Simeon and M. Krasnick, Federalism and Economic Union in Canada, (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1986) at 26 and 162. 
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traditional Weberian notions of legal legitimacy.  In other words, authority must be consistent 
with pro forma rules as well as “rules in use” as determined by previous institutional interaction.  
Second, authority must be legitimate in that it does not contradict the federal values held by the 
political communities and fostered by federalism.  These values are shaped by the historical 
background to the federation, the constitutional texts, the legal interpretation of the constitutional 
texts and the rules in use formed from dialogue between political communities in the federation. 
Therefore, at a minimum, legitimacy of governmental action in a federal system must always be 
shown to be consistent, or at least not inconsistent, with the federal contract.  The contract is 
based on the mutual consent of the constituent units to legislative or executive action by the 
federal government.  This consent will be determined primarily by a contractual interpretation of 
the historic reading of the federal constitution coloured by both the formal constitutional rules as 
well as “rules in use”.  Moreover, the political communities within the federal system must not 
have a sense that action is being imposed on them illegitimately, in that it is without their 
consent.  Where this occurs, the constituent political communities’ trust in the federation will be 
undermined and the long-term viability of the federation compromised.  As LaSelva notes: “No 
constitutional system can endure an endless questioning of its legitimacy”.117 
The goal of horizontal transnational implementation of international environmental law in 
Canada is to encourage vertical implementation and, ultimately, internalization of norms 
established by international conventions.  These norms will not be accepted at the deep level 
deemed necessary by transnational legal process theorists unless Canadian citizens perceive the 
methods as legitimate.  An important component of legitimate governance in Canada is the 
shared understanding that federal action cannot be unreasonably imposed on a discrete provincial 
political community absent consultation with the community.  The level of consultation will be 
greater if a policy touches upon something that the provincial political community sees as central 
to its community identity.  
 
117 S.V. LaSelva, supra note 116 at 195. 
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1.0 Canadian Federalism 
 
The Canadian nation presupposes federalism.  In Reference re Secession of Quebec, the court 
stated:118 
This underlying principle of federalism, then, has exercised a role of considerable 
importance in the interpretation of the written provisions of our Constitution. In the 
Patriation Reference, supra, at pp. 905-9, we confirmed that the principle of 
federalism runs through the political and legal systems of Canada. Indeed, Martland 
and Ritchie JJ., dissenting in the Patriation Reference, at p. 821, considered 
federalism to be "the dominant principle of Canadian constitutional law". With the 
enactment of the Charter, that proposition may have less force than it once did, but 
there can be little doubt that the principle of federalism remains a central 
organizational theme of our Constitution. Less obviously, perhaps, but certainly of 
equal importance, federalism is a political and legal response to underlying social 
and political realities. 
The principle of federalism recognizes the diversity of the component parts of 
Confederation, and the autonomy of provincial governments to develop their 
societies within their respective spheres of jurisdiction. The federal structure of our 
country also facilitates democratic participation by distributing power to the 
government thought to be most suited to achieving the particular societal objective 
having regard to this diversity.  
Canadian federalism is based on a: “complex form of fraternity that can promote a just society 
characterized by a humanistic liberalism and a democratic dialogue.”119 The democratic dialogue 
can be seen in the historical compact, the constitutional text and its legal interpretation as well as 
the patterns of interaction between the provinces.  The law of the Constitution is made up of the 
statutes and common law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution Act, 1867120. The law 
of the Constitution is also shaped by the historical rationale for federalism and the subsequent 
legal interpretation of the constitutional texts.  Indeed, as W.R. Lederman writes:121 
118 [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at para 57. 
119 S.V. LaSelva, supra note 116 at xiii. 
120 Supra, note 106. 
121 W.R. Lederman, "Unity and Diversity in Canadian Federalism: Ideals and Methods of Moderation" (1975), 53 
Can. Bar. Rev. 597 at 600 
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It is a mistake to think that the task of interpretation is grammatical  
and syntactical only, treating the constitution document in isolation  
from the economic, social and cultural facts of life of the society to  
which the constitutional document relates, both historically and  
currently.   
The federal foundation of Canada is based on the notion of political community and its 
contractual visions of legitimacy rather than the rights based, and resulting individualist, focus of 
other federations such as the United States.  Georges Etienne Cartier, one of the fathers of 
confederation, envisioned a new kind of nationality in which different ways of life flourished, 
but whose peoples had come together to promote the good of all and were united by a “political 
nationality”.122 
In his book, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy,123 Richard Simeon notes that a central characteristic 
of modern federal systems is the co-existence of governments, which are at the same time 
interdependent and autonomous. Interdependence implies that many fields cut across formal 
divisions of responsibility. Because of the interdependence and the community base of Canadian 
federalism, judicial determinations of jurisdiction become less appealing. Katherine Swinton 
notes: 124 
When Simeon spoke of the community perspective, he suggested that the search 
for the appropriate community was drawn from citizen views about jurisdiction.  
This focus on a source outside the judge is appealing, because it seems to meet 
charges of subjectivity and illegitimacy.   
As a result, Simeon states that the guiding principle of modern federalism is the need for 
cooperation.  F.R. Scott noticed, with frustration, the increasingly dominant position of federal-
provincial diplomacy and the agreements in the Canadian polity:125 
122 S.L. LaSelva, supra note 116 at 25. 
123 R. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press 1972). 
124 K. E. Swinton, The Supreme Court and Canadian Federalism, (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 207. 
125 F.R. Scott, supra note 140 at 59. 
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Despite the wording of the constitution, and despite her growth in international 
prestige and importance, Canada is now, eighty-five years after Confederation, 
troubled with such a trend toward “States Rights” (to use Macdonald’s name for it) 
that the federal government must rely more and more on a new legal doctrine of 
“national emergency” in order to legislate on matters of unquestioned national 
importance, and the national Parliament is increasingly obliged to defer to agreements 
made in a kind of General Assembly of Sovereign Provinces called a Dominion-
Provincial Conference, where each government possesses a veto over decisions.  
In areas of new legislative competence, reliance on diplomacy is especially acute. 
Constitutionally, every provincial government is autonomous in that neither the federal or 
provincial governments may exercise control over the other.  Where authority is allocated 
unambiguously, neither level can dictate to the other.126 Lord Atkin noted this in the Labour 
Conventions case: 127 
…while the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters she 
still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original 
structure.    
Conversely, Lord Stanley in Edwards v. A.G. Canada maintained that: 128 
…the B.N.A. Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion 
within its natural limits.   
Both of these views are expressed in federal-provincial models of diplomacy.  As was explained 
in chapter two, legitimacy in the implementation of environmental agreements is dependant on 
compliance with institutional arrangements and long-standing “rules in use” that are just as 
important as the formal legal documents.  As such, institutionalism, the study of the interaction of 
institutions at the international law-making level, becomes an important tool in determining how 
successful implementation of MEAs is achieved in the Canadian federal state.  In this section of 
the paper, I will examine Canadian federal-provincial relations through an institutional lens.  It 
will become apparent that models of institutional interaction are important in defining legitimate 
policy making in the Canadian federation.    
 
126 R. Simeon, supra note 190 at 3-4. 
127 A.G. Canada v. A.G. Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326 at 354. 
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Harvey Lazar notes that there is a spectrum of federal relations in Canadian federalism.  These 
models are relevant to the way in which broad policy frameworks are developed and how such 
policies are implemented.  Policy implementation includes all facets of program design, 
interpretation, monitoring and enforcement.  The models include cooperative federalism, 
competitive federalism, and collaborative federalism.129 
Each of these models is used in policy implementation within the Canadian federation.  The 
collaborative model is often used where the constitution authorizes both orders of government to 
act in a particular subject area. It is marked by political and administrative agreements among 
governments addressing how they intend jointly to deal with matters of public policy or public 
administration.  Moreover, the agreements imply: “freely given political consent as there is no 
constitutional requirement to act in this way; and to qualify as consensual one order of 
government cannot be ‘forced’ to agree to the dictates of the other by virtue of some form of 
financial or other dependence on the other order”. 130 The collaborative model has emerged as 
the favoured model of federal-provincial diplomacy especially with respect to areas of shared 
jurisdiction like environmental policy. 
The collaborative approach is somewhat ambiguous.  Lazar describes it as:131 
…case by case management of individual files under which improved relations with 
provinces, including Quebec, were an important determinant of the federal approach 
but by no means the sole or even the overriding consideration.  In that sense, the non-
constitutional approach was less a strategy than an umbrella under which it was 
possible to group many federal initiatives and activities.  What these measures all had 
in common was that they did not entail constitutional change, they generally involved 
less spending and they required new understandings between the two orders of 
government.  This approach was characterized also by the idea that the kind of 
intergovernmental relationship that is appropriate will vary according to the functional 
realities and specific circumstances of each file. 
 
128 [1930] A.C. 114 at 136. 
129 H. Lazar, “The Federal Role in a New Social Union”, Canada: The State of the Federation 1997, (Kingston: 
Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1997) 105 at 110-111. 
130 H. Lazar, supra note 196 at 111. 
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Constitutional Renewal (Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press, 1998) at 10. 
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Thus, collaborative federalism is a process whereby national goals are achieved, not by the 
federal government acting alone or by the federal government shaping provincial behaviour 
through the exercise of its spending power, but by some or all of the 11 federal and provincial 
governments and the territories acting collectively.132 Richard Simeon notes that collaborative 
federalism may take two forms.133 The first is collaboration among federal, provincial, and 
territorial governments seeking appropriate roles and responsibilities.  The second form is 
collaboration among provincial and territorial governments without the federal government.  
Working under one of these two frameworks, the provinces, territories and the federal 
government have reached agreement for national policies regarding health, internal trade, social 
policy, and the environment.   
All of these agreements have been concluded in one or another institutional “ministerial council”. 
The number of councils has increased and they have played a more formal role in policy 
implementation. As Richard Simeon notes:134 
They (ministerial councils) have become the workhorses of the system, assuming a 
central role in the policy process, including, in some cases, developing close 
relationships with related interest groups. Councils now exist for ministries concerned 
with social-policy renewal, forestry, transportation, education, and the environment. 
Other groupings of ministers go by names such as forums, committees, and meetings 
of "Ministers Responsible." Some meet regularly, others on an ad hoc basis. 
Simeon also notes several common threads to these agreements and their negotiation.135 First, the 
equality between provinces and Ottawa is always at the forefront. Most councils and meetings are 
co-chaired by a federal and a provincial minister.  The northern territories of Canada-Yukon, the 
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut - are now integrated with the provinces.  
Most agreements stress that the formal constitutional powers assigned to 
governments remain unchanged; the goal is to exercise these powers in a coordinated manner. 
 
132 Simeon, supra note 190 at 55. 
133 Id at 56. 
134 Id at 62. 
135 Id,at 63. 
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There is an emphasis on minimizing duplication and overlap in order to achieve greater 
efficiency and cost saving.  Finally, presumably in response to criticisms of executive federalism, 
an increasing number of agreements explicitly acknowledge the need to engage stakeholders in 
the process.   
The collaborative approach recognizes the consensual nature of the federal contract and the 
equality of the provinces.  Lazar notes that this model is now dominant in every field.136 
Moreover, it is doubtful that another model will emerge, at least as the primary one, in the field of 
environmental policy making.   
 
Although Canadian federalism generally exhibits several dynamics including competitive 
federalism, cooperative federalism and collaborative federalism, the history of environmental 
policy in Canada is one of collaborative federalism.  As Grace Skogstad notes:137 
The negative impacts on Canadian public policy of strong provincial and national 
governments, often competing, sometimes cooperating, but always central to the 
formulation of economic and social policies, have been widely viewed to 
overshadow any positive benefits.  Most critical assessments are predicated on the 
model of competitive federalism, one that highlights the intergovernmental conflict 
that results from self-aggrandizing and self-preserving behaviour of governmental 
elites.  This model has not tended to prevail historically when it comes to pollution 
control policy. 
 
Transnational legal theory, which is predicated on dialogue between state and non-state actors, is 
particularly useful in examining policy implementation in the Canadian federation. The 
collaborative model has long been the means of implementing policy in the environmental field. 
Furthermore, there is no clear constitutional legislative power over the environment `at either 
level of government and many provinces are hostile to federal unilateralism in the area138 and 
growing weary of the precarious legal nature of federal commitments in areas where cooperative 
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federalism is prevalent.139 Finally, the competitive model has attracted much hostility from the 
environmental movement.140 Indeed, Kenneth McRoberts doubts that the federal government can 
deviate from the collaborative model where jurisdiction is shared.  McRoberts states:141 
…within areas occupied by both levels of government, unilateralism would seem to 
be costly for the Canadian system as a whole.  Without federal-provincial 
collaboration, there is bound to be duplication and waste.  A government that is 
concerned with achieving “visibility” and which initiates programs to do so, is 
bound to duplicate some existing programs of the other level of government.  More 
important, there is the possibility that, without consultation and collaboration, the 
two levels of government will develop contradictory policies. 
In general, it can be demonstrated that while the legal basis for federal-provincial models of 
diplomacy is murky, the patterns of relations remain part of provincial political communities’ 
understanding of legitimate policy implementation and cannot be ignored.  This is especially true 
where jurisdiction is shared, as is the case with environmental policy-making.   
 
139 see supra p. 65. 
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Part II:  IMPLEMENTATION OF CITES IN CANADA 
1.0 Introduction: Regulation of Trade Under CITES 
Lon Fuller and W.R. Perdue wrote in 1937:142 
The proposition that legal rules can be understood only with reference to the 
purposes they serve would today scarcely be regarded as an exciting truth.  The 
notion that law exists as a means to an end has been commonplace for at least half a 
century.  There is, however, no justification for assuming, because this attitude has 
now achieved respectability, and even triteness, that it enjoys a pervasive application 
in practice.  Certainly there are even today few legal treatises of which it may be 
said that the author has throughout clearly defined the purposes which his definitions 
and distinctions serve.  We are still all too willing to embrace the conceit that it is 
possible to manipulate legal concepts without the orientation which comes from the 
simple inquiry: toward what end is this activity directed? 
Nietzsche reminds us: "The most fundamental form of human stupidity is forgetting what we 
were trying to do in the first place." 
This Part of the paper will examine the process of implementing international environmental law 
in Canada through and examination of the domestic implementation of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).  In order to avoid 
the conceit warned against by Fuller and Perdue, I will, first, explain the background to CITES 
and the requirements they impose on member states in order to elucidate the underlying norms of 
this conventions.   
Next, the specific requirements imposed on member states will be explained.  Third, the manner 
in which these requirements are addressed in the domestic implementation of the convention in 
Canada will be examined.  Finally, I will attempt to determine the degree to which the norms 
were internalized.   
In examining the degree to which the norms of these conventions are internalized, the primary 
test will be the degree to which Canadian domestic legislation achieves the purposes, as they 
 
142 L. Fuller & W.R. Perdue, “The Reliance Interest in Contract” (1937), 46 Yale L.J. 52 at 52. 
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have evolved, of CITES in light of the challenges posed to environmental policy making by 
federalism.  The successful implementation of international environmental law is dependant on 
“internalizing” environmental norms within domestic actors so that they act out of a “logic of 
appropriateness” rather than a “logic of consequences”. The broad purpose of CITES is to protect 
the environment.  The means chosen to do this is to restrict trade in both hazardous wastes and 
endangered species.  CITES establishes a standardized system of controls on the trade of certain 
species of flora and fauna within the framework of international commercial transactions.143 The 
rules of the dominant liberal economic ideology require that regulation that restricts trade be 
based on an ethical or moral norm, in this case environmental protection that takes precedence 
over the values of the liberal economic order.144 Otherwise, it will be seen as an illegitimate 
restriction on the already internalized liberal trade regime. Accordingly, the norms underlying 
CITES must be accepted by states at the international level as a legitimate restriction on liberal 
trade.145 Gabrielle Marceau of the World Trade Organization explains:146 
There are hundreds of treaties dealing with environmental issues.   Many of these 
have implications for international trade.  Because economic activity relies on and 
affects the environment, MEAs regularly encourage, and sometimes require, States 
to enact measures that affect the way economic activity within or between States is 
conducted.  In addition, a narrower category of MEAs uses specific trade measures 
to address environmental harm by regulating the transboundary movement of certain 
environmentally harmful products. 
CITES focuses on the regulation of international trade in endangered species of flora and fauna in 
order to protect such species and preserve the biodiversity that is essential to the ecosystem.  
Acceptance of these trade restrictions will require internalization of the norms of the conventions 
at both the domestic and international level.  
 
143 J. Thomsen and A. Brautigam, “CITES in the European Economic Community: Who Benefits? (1987), 5 B.U. 
Int’l L.J. 269 at 272; J. Heinen and D. Chapagain, “On the Expansion of Species Protection in Nepal: Advances and 
Pitfalls of New Efforts to Implement and Comply with CITES” (2002), 5 Int. Wildlife and Policy 235 at 237. 
144 M.  Trebilcock & R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, (London: Routledge, 1995) at 360. 
145 Id, at 360. 
146 G. Marceau, “Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdiction: The Relationship between the WTO Agreement 
and MEAs and other Treaties” (2001), 35(6) Journal of World Trade 1081 at 1095 (Marceau specifically cites 
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The background to CITES that follows demonstrates the internalization of the norms of the 
convention at the international level.  Following the adoption of the Stockholm Declaration in 
1972 the development of international environmental policy and law progressed towards what 
can be termed a “holistic” approach.147 There is now recognition of the need to address 
environmental protection in terms of protecting the earth as a whole.  The idea of a collective 
responsibility of the world community to protect the environment from such harm is now more 
broadly internalized in the international community.   
The broad purpose of the conventions has similarly evolved over time.  The provisions of CITES 
initially were considered by the parties, particularly Canada, to be a trade agreement and were 
implemented using existing domestic trade legislation.  Since ratification, the Canadian 
understanding of the purposes of the conventions has broadened.  This paper will demonstrate 
that Canadian legislation implementing CITES domestically is now more clearly linked to 
environmental protection through a commitment to broadly accepted concepts of the 
precautionary principle and cooperation between states.   
Moreover, there has been a shift in international policy and law from the traditional mechanisms 
focusing on remedies for environmental damage after the event to mechanisms that aim for 
prevention of environmental damage.  These mechanisms focus on obligations to implement or 
make changes to domestic policy and include: 148 
• The absolute or conditional prohibition of certain activities;  
• The requirement of prior informed consent (PIC);  
• Requirements of prior environmental assessment and evaluation; 
• Requirements of exchange of information, consultation, cooperation, and technical financial 
assistance; 
 
147 K. Kummer, International Management of Hazardous Wastes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at 32.; see also P. 
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• Requirements of emergency preparedness and elaboration of emergency plans; 
• The adoption and application of technical norms setting qualitative and quantitative 
standards; and  
• The establishment of specialized institutions with the functions of policy formulation, 
facilitation of international cooperation and compliance monitoring. 
 
The evolution of CITES has mirrored this shift.  When examining the international and domestic 
legislative regime governing trade in endangered species and the degree to which it has been 
internalized, one question must be kept in mind: toward what end is this activity directed?  The 
narrow goal of CITES may be stated quite simply: to regulate international trade in endangered 
species.  However, this narrow goal has evolved and is now linked to broader holistic goals 
related to sustainable use of endangered species in order to preserve biodiversity. More recently, 
these more holistic goals have taken a central place in attempts to implement CITES domestically 
in Canada.   Accordingly, this chapter will look at the historical background to the international 
law of trade in endangered species generally, and CITES in particular, as well as the evolution of 
the Canadian legislative regime.  It will be demonstrated that as the international and domestic 
regimes have evolved, the link between the effective regulation of trade in endangered species 
and society’s broader goal to preserve biodiversity has tended to become more prominent. 
Today, the worldwide commercial exchange of wildlife (including plants) is estimated to be up to 
50 billion USD annually.149 Exploitation of wildlife for profit is a long-standing phenomenon 
and attempts to regulate it domestically and internationally came at an early stage.150 The 
exponential increase in humankind’s potential to exploit wildlife on a grand scale led to 
significant species depletion.151 CITES establishes a standardized system of controls on the trade 
of certain wildlife species among its contracting parties within the framework of international 
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commercial transactions.152 Under CITES, trade is banned or limited in species listed in three 
revisable appendices through a system of import/export permits issued by the parties.   
Early legislation aimed at regulating trade in endangered species was concerned almost 
exclusively with the protection of wildlife for its economic potential.  Domestic legislation has 
been in place for a long time in the form of poaching and conservation laws to protect wild flora 
and fauna from over-exploitation.153 However, early attempts at broader environmental 
protection can also be found in several conventions, both regional and international, aimed at 
protecting various species of plants and animals.154 International conventions aimed at wildlife 
protection gradually shifted in focus from protection of the economic potential of wildlife to 
protection of biodiversity.   
The origin of CITES lies in the United Nations’ Arusha Conference of 1961.  The conference 
proposed an international convention to control trade in endangered species.155 This was 
reiterated at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972.  A diplomatic 
conference held at Washington D.C. adopted the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora156 (CITES) in 1973.   
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From its inception, CITES was seen as the flagship of wildlife preservation treaties.  There was a 
far greater impetus from both parties and interested non-state actors to get the agreement under 
way than for previous similar conventions.157 Indeed, it has become the world’s best-known 
wildlife conservation convention.158 CITES is both a conservation and trade instrument aimed at 
protecting wild flora and fauna to preserve the natural environment.159 
No treaty protects all wild flora and fauna on a global basis160 but five international treaties come 
close to accomplishing this goal.161 The 1992 Rio Convention of Biological Diversity162 
recognizes that the environment depends on a wide variety of plant and animal species to remain 
healthy and human development has served to reduce this variety. 163 Accordingly, although 
there is much debate on what means should be used to preserve that biodiversity, there is a 
general consensus that a precautionary approach should be adopted that both identifies serious 
threats to biodiversity and also outlines the measures required to counter the erosion of 
biodiversity.164 The precautionary approach to protecting biodiversity lends normative force to 
specific instruments outlined in other treaties.   
The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar) stresses the need to protect 
habitats as an integral part of retaining biodiversity.165 The Convention for the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage imposes an obligation on states to conserve and protect the 
natural heritage, including habitats, of threatened species of animals and plants with respect to 
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specific sites (although that is not its primary focus). 166 The Convention on the Conservation of 
Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn Convention)167 relates to protection of species that 
cross international borders and their habitats including migratory paths crossing borders. Finally, 
CITES attempts to regulate and, in some cases prohibit, the trade in endangered species.   
Taken together, these treaties fail to address all human interaction with wildlife.  However, they 
do reveal the key issues the international community has concluded must be addressed for 
successful protection of biodiversity.  These can be summarized as:  
• sustainability of use;  
• flexibility in regulatory systems;  
• maintenance of habitats and ecosystems;  
• control of introduction of alien species;  
• creation of protected areas or reserves; and 
• limitation of trade in endangered species of animals and plants.   
The principal purpose of CITES, therefore, is to ban or limit trade in species listed in revisable 
appendices through a system of import/export permits issued by the parties.  However, it is part 
of an international effort aimed at protecting biodiversity.  Rosalind Reeve states:168 
But even if wildlife trade is not the main cause of biodiversity loss, the pressure of 
international consumer demand adversely affects many individual species.  
Collection and harvest from the wild for trade can also cause collateral damage to 
ecosystems through the removal of keystone species, specific age classes or sexes; 
the removal of plants providing a food supply for wild fauna; or the use of 
destructive collection techniques such as cyanide and dynamite fishing.  
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Through a biennial COP, reporting by parties and domestic legislation, the institutional 
framework underlying CITES is aimed at achieving this goal.  In recent years, the COP has 
increasingly seen its mandate as extending beyond trade to preserving biodiversity through its 
original purpose of restricting trade in endangered species of flora and fauna.169 
The preamble sets out the normative values of CITES, which are also reflected in the Biodiversity 
Convention, as well as international environmental law generally.  CITES is based on an 
understanding that a wide variety of fauna and flora is an irreplaceable part of the natural 
ecosystem of the earth.  Further, the diversity must be maintained by protecting it not just for this 
generation but for generations to come.  Finally, CITES maintains the practical need for 
maintaining biodiversity in species of wild fauna and flora not just from an aesthetic, but also a 
scientific, cultural, recreational and economic viewpoint. 170 
In order to achieve these goals, CITES lists several species of flora and fauna in three appendices 
and places trade restrictions on them.  Domestic institutions monitor trade and gather scientific 
data in order to identify those species that are endangered or may become endangered.  The 
convention outlines the circumstances under which trade in endangered species may take place. 
Generally, depending on the danger of extinction, trade in certain species deemed endangered by 
the parties is permitted under CITES only where a permit is obtained recognizing the prior 
informed consent of the importing and exporting state to the proposed trade.  The CITES 
Conference in 1992 defined the necessary minimum of domestic implementation measures as 
establishing legal authority to:171 
(a) designate at least one Management Authority and one Scientific Authority;  
(b) prohibit trade in specimens in violation of the Convention; 
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(c) penalize such trade; and 
(d) confiscate specimens illegally traded or possessed. 
 
1.0.0 Domestic Control of Trade in Endangered Species
Instead of drafting new legislation, the Canadian government used existing legislation to 
implement CITES in 1975. The Export and Import Permits Act172 and the Game Export Act173 
were amended to include CITES species. The Export and Import Permits Act regulates the export 
and import of articles that are scarce in Canada, or in the world, or subject to governmental 
controls in other countries.  Export and import permits are required for various goods listed in 
two schedules: an Export Control List and an Import Control List.174 These lists were amended 
to include species subject to CITES regulations. Permits were required to trade in protected 
species in compliance with the basic CITES permit requirements.  
The Game Export Act was enacted in 1941 to deter poachers from escaping prosecution by 
simply leaving the jurisdiction in which the animal was illegally taken.175 The Game Export Act 
required permits for interprovincial transport, and export outside of Canada, of dead game, and 
possession of game killed in another province or jurisdiction.176 The agencies responsible for 
enforcing the domestic regime, federally, were Revenue Canada and the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police.177 In the provinces, wildlife officers enforced the provisions of the Game 
Export Act.
It is not uncommon for MEAs to prescribe weaker standards than those in place domestically in 
developed states, in order to attract more parties.178 Only the most essential elements are 
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mandatory, but it is hoped that those member states that are able to will go beyond the obligatory 
provisions.179 CITES is especially dependant on this. The predominant direction of the trade in 
endangered species is south to north, mainly driven by consumer demand from developed 
countries for fashion, food, medical/pharmaceutical research, exhibition or collection purposes.180 
As wealthier parties make up the market for trade in endangered species, enforcement of both the 
minimum requirements and the overall broader goals becomes essential in order to effectively 
control this market.   
Accordingly, domestic legislation in Canada must go beyond the minimum requirements in order 
to uphold the broader environmental goals of CITES.  Domestic legislation should be coordinated 
to address domestic problems that may be outside the scope of CITES but undermine its broader 
goals.181 These domestic problems include:182 
• domestic legislation that favours land owners’ property rights over wildlife roaming their 
land;  
• absence of incentives for “good practice”; 
• corruption among officials; 
• a lack of political interest in conservation; 
• inadequate human and financial resources; 
• lack of effective penalties for transgressions of domestic law; 
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• poor record-keeping; and 
• trade with non-parties. 
In Canada, some of these general criticisms of domestic implementation were specifically 
relevant to the Export and Import Permit Act and the Game Export Act regime including 
enforcement, record-keeping and federal-provincial issues. 
Only two people were charged by the R.C.M.P. for CITES export violations between 1988 and 
1992. Indeed, it has been estimated by Lynn Marshall that less than one percent of illegal 
Canadian wildlife exports were identified in that year.183 Studies of other jurisdictions such as 
Russia, Finland and the United States produced similar results.184 Although the Export and 
Import Permits Act controlled international entry of illegal endangered species products, it did 
not outlaw possession, purchase or sale of such products. 
Several other flaws in the regime prevented effective enforcement of the underlying norms of 
CITES, even if the minimum requirements of the convention were met. The Game Export Act 
was insufficient in regulating trade because it applied solely to dead game species. The Game 
Export Act and Export and Import Permit Act did not make it illegal to import wildlife or wildlife 
products taken illegally in their country of origin. The Federal government lacked the power to 
prosecute persons in one province who have violated endangered species laws in another 
province.   The maximum penalty for an indictable offence under the Export and Import Permit 
Act was a fine up to $25,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years.185 This fine was far below 
other jurisdictions' penalties, such as the U.S., and Canada was an attractive point of transit for 
illegal trafficking.186 
Further, there was a lack of resources available to enforce the Acts. There were only 32 wildlife 
enforcement officers in the Canadian Wildlife Service, and less than 10 of these worked on 
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CITES enforcement full time.187 Because of the lack of manpower and other resources dedicated 
to CITES enforcement in Canada, the record keeping was predictably weak.  
The federal government considers integration of federal-provincial efforts to implement CITES 
essential to effective implementation of the convention in Canada.188 Bill C-42 (the Wild Animal 
and Plant Protection and Regulation of International and Interprovincial Trade Act 
(WAPPRIITA)) was introduced in 1991 following four federal-provincial workshops. At the 
1990 Meeting of the Wildlife Ministers Council of Canada, the Ministers discussed expanding 
the scope of wildlife policy.  The purpose was to provide a comprehensive set of policies guiding 
the management of Canada's wildlife. The Wildlife Policy stated that: "Canadians are 
increasingly concerned with biodiversity ... and not just the birds and land mammals that 
traditionally have been termed ‘wildlife’."189 It further noted that governments should broaden 
their definition of wildlife to include any species of wild organism.190 Whereas provincial 
wildlife departments had previously focused on game animals and commercial and sport 
fisheries, their focus began to change, due to the federal government's changing policies to 
wildlife, as influenced by the international regime.191 
On October 2nd 1996, the federal, provincial and territorial governments agreed upon a National 
Accord. Under this Accord, the provinces and territories agreed to cooperate with the federal 
government to ensure that complementary legislation was in place for endangered species 
protection in Canada.192 
However, governments were just one of the groups advocating a new approach to CITES 
implementation that went beyond simple compliance with the minimum obligations.  In 1987, the 
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Government of Canada sponsored the meeting of the sixth COP to CITES. The then Minister of 
the Environment announced that Environment Canada was developing new legislation to control 
international trade in, and interprovincial transport of, foreign and Canadian wild species.193 In a 
February 1991 submission to the Minister of the Environment a coalition of leading wildlife and 
nature organizations, known as the Group of Eight, identified 10 priority issues for biodiversity 
and sustainable development in Canada.  One of these was improved federal wildlife legislation 
concerning poaching and illegal trade in wildlife and effective enforcement of such legislation.194 
The new legislation also had as its impetus the 1990 federal Green Plan for a Healthy 
Environment.  The plan proposed introduction of new legislation to deter poaching and illegal 
trading of wild animals and plants.195 Lee Clark, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of the 
Environment cited these two reports when introducing WAPPRITTA noting specifically:196 
Any coordinated and comprehensive approach aimed at fostering a healthy environment must 
take into account the protection of wildlife. 
At the second reading of Bill C-42, Jean Charest, Minister of the Environment, identified three 
objectives for the new legislation:197 
• To protect wild animal and plant species in foreign countries from poaching and 
smuggling; 
• To protect Canada’s wild animal and plant species from illegal trade; and 
• To protect Canada’s ecosystems from the introduction of designated harmful species or so-
called biological pollutants. 
The result of the broad-based consultations with provincial governments and environmental 
groups was the adoption of the WAPPRIITA in 1992.  WAPPRIITA was proclaimed in force on 
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May 14, 1996.198 The legislation addressed the concerns surrounding the old legislative regime.  
Additionally, the new legislation was more cognizant of both CITES’ broader objective to protect 
the environment by maintaining biodiversity as well as federal-provincial cooperation.  
Harold Koh distinguishes between three forms of internalization: social, political, and legal.  
Social internalization occurs when a norm acquires so much public legitimacy that there is 
widespread general adherence to it.  Political internalization occurs when the political elites 
accept an international norm and advocate its adoption as a matter of government policy.  Legal 
internalization occurs when an international norm is incorporated into the domestic legal system 
and becomes domestic law through executive action, legislative action, judicial interpretation or 
some combination of the three.199 
In a federal system, effective implementation of an MEA requires all three forms of 
internalization outlined by Professor Koh.  The federal government has the constitutional 
jurisdiction to ratify an MEA and bind Canada to the obligations therein but must engage in 
consultation with the provinces in order to effectively implement such legislation.  Thus, 
effective environmental governance in Canada requires political internalization as well.  In order 
to achieve consensus among the political elite, a degree of social internalization is required so 
that domestic non-governmental actors will lobby the federal and provincial governments to 
implement their international commitments.    
As was demonstrated in Part I of this paper, implementation of environmental norms in the 
Canadian federation usually depends on collaborative federalism.  Collaborative federalism uses 
negotiation and consensus-building between the provinces and the federal government to give the 
implementation of environmental policy legitimacy and thereby successfully internalize the 
norms promoted by policy initiatives.   An important catalyst to such cooperation is public 
acceptance of the international environmental norms underlying environmental policy.  
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CITES strikes a balance between a so-called “framework” treaty, which would lay down the 
fundamental principles only and leave the regulation of details to regional agreements, and a 
detailed global regime leaving no room for divergent regional regulation.  While establishing 
fairly detailed global standards, CITES allows for regional regulation that takes into account the 
specific situations and needs of individual groups of countries.  These regional rules do not have 
to conform to the provisions of the conventions in every detail, but may not derogate from its 
fundamental concepts.200 In other words, neither convention is:201 
…“self-executing” so implementation requires – in addition to the formal act of ratification and 
promulgation in the national language – series of follow-up measures at the appropriate 
legislative and administrative level of each country (and at several levels in federal states). 
Rather than imposing a supranational regulatory mechanism of its own, the regime relies on 
reciprocal recognition of national regulatory decisions, provided that these are made in 
accordance with mutually agreed standards.202 Therefore, the individual states have a certain 
degree of policy instrument choice in implementing the conventions.  
Transnational legal scholars attempt to reconcile the general aim of international governance with 
the specific instrument choices of domestic governance.  Legitimate implementation of 
international environmental law in Canada is dependent upon policy implementation that is 
consistent with the normative values of federalism that are revealed both by the law of the 
constitution and these established patterns of federal-provincial diplomacy.  
The concept of policy instruments comes from recent literature on public policy. Policy 
instruments can be defined as strategies and resources employed by governments to facilitate 
designated ends and goals vis-à-vis target populations.203 The central idea behind theory on 
policy instruments is that governments can act through different instruments to achieve particular 
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goals, and that the instruments chosen are important because they usually involve significantly 
different policy-making processes and produce different effects.  Most treaties both require and 
seek to facilitate adoption of national measures to enhance treaty implementation and 
compliance.204 Indeed, the strengthening of MEA compliance systems is one of the most 
important tasks facing international environmental law today.205 For regulatory MEAs such as 
CITES, which places specific obligations on parties, it is particularly important that these self-
policing systems are effective.206 These MEAs equally rely on member states to adopt effective 
policy to implement the conventions domestically. 
Many factors affect implementation and compliance levels; including the political environment, 
public opinion, preference of politicians, NGO and INGO advocacy and economic issues in 
individual nations.207 In Canada, an important factor affecting implementation is provincial 
political communities’ acceptance of the norms underlying an MEA. 
In examining CITES, I have identified five areas in which the convention lays down some 
specific international standards.  I will then examine the policy instrument choices made by the 
Canadian government to respond to these international standards and how federalism affected the 
policy instrument choice.  The areas that I have identified where CITES lays down specific 
international standards are:  
• Institutional Oversight 
• Identification of Items Subject to Regulation 
• Prior Informed Consent 
• Information Sharing with Other Parties and Citizens of Member States 
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CITES, like many MEAs relies on a compliance system overseen by domestic and international 
institutional structures.208 Accordingly, in this part of the paper I will examine first the 
institutional structure of the convention, addressed in the first category above, and its counterpart 
in Canada, as well as the compliance systems, addressed by the subsequent four categories, set up 
by the MEAs.  The compliance systems advanced by each of the headings have also been 
addressed domestically in Canada and in each area the “fact of federalism” affected the policies 
chosen.   
Institutional Oversight  
 
Any examination of environmental agreements will require assessment of the larger institutional 
structures underlying the agreements.209 Institutional interaction relies on compliance with both 
formal procedural rules as well as historical patterns of interaction for its legitimacy.  This is 
primarily because:210 
Institutional supervision, shifting the focus from individual states to intergovernmental entities, 
places the emphasis on multilateral compliance and supervision, while still relying on states as 
guarantors of compliance with international rules by individuals.  Instead of confrontation 
between ‘polluter’ and ‘victim’ state, however, this mechanism relies on negotiation and public 
pressure. 
MEAs function through an institutional hierarchy.  Kummer notes:211 
Practically all the newer international treaties on environmental protection set up an institutional 
framework with the functions of administering the treaty, assisting parties in meeting their 
obligations, facilitating mutual assistance and the exchange of information, and monitoring 
compliance. 
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With most MEAs, the COP is the supreme body.  Typically, the COP will meet on a regular basis 
to examine the effectiveness of the MEA regime and recommend or adopt changes to its 
operation. For example, at the 12th meeting of the COP of CITES at Santiago, Chile in November 
of 2002, the COP made 100 decisions including adding big leaf mahogany to Appendix II and 
adopting various reports on the status of implementation of the treaty and illegal traffic in 
endangered species.212 This involved extensive negotiation among member states.  With respect 
to Canada, the position taken, although constitutionally a federal responsibility, was the result of 
several months of negotiations between federal agencies, provincial governments, industry and 
environmental groups.  Indeed all of these groups had representatives on the Canadian delegation 
in Santiago.213 This process demonstrates that implementation, through institutional interaction, 
of international law relies on both the formal procedures and past practice that have become “soft 
law”.214 
CITES has a system of international, and domestic, institutional supervision.  CITES learned 
from the negative lessons of previous conventions, notably the 1933 London Convention215, and 
established an institutional structure with autonomous bodies for decision-making and periodic 
treaty adjustment.216 The COP is the supreme decision-making body and meets every two years.  
The COP’s functions include adopting amendments to Appendices I and II, reviewing progress 
on restoring species, and making recommendations for improving the convention.217 CITES has 
an elaborate committee structure that reviews the implementation and the adequacy of 
commitments.  This institutional structure was quickly established after the convention came into 
force.218 A secretariat was initially provided by the Executive Director of the United Nations 
Environment Programme pursuant to Article 12 of the Convention. CITES now has its own 
secretariat.  Inter-governmental, non-governmental international and national agencies and bodies 
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technically qualified in protection, conservation and management of wild fauna and flora assist 
the secretariat.219 
The CITES Secretariat’s primary role is to ensure implementation of the Convention.220 It also 
arranges meetings of the parties, undertakes scientific and technical studies, publishes and 
distributes to the parties current editions of Appendices I, II and III which list species subject to 
the convention’s trade restrictions, and prepares annual reports.221Article 13 gives the Secretariat 
a supervisory role.  It informs parties if they are not effectively implementing the convention and 
proposes remedial action. 
Under the convention, CITES member states must establish an institutional framework 
domestically to regulate trade in endangered species of flora and fauna.  Rather than imposing a 
supranational regulatory mechanism of its own, the regime relies on reciprocal recognition of 
national regulatory decisions, provided that these are made in accordance with mutually agreed 
standards. 222 
Each party must designate one or more Management Authorities and one or more Scientific 
Authorities. 223 The Scientific Authority is charged with compiling information regarding the 
status of species of flora and fauna within the member state’s territory.  The Management 
Authority communicates with other parties and the Secretariat.  In this way, the Management 
Authorities operate the system on behalf of the international community.224 The names and 
addresses of the Management Authority and Scientific Authority must be indicated on a party’s 
instrument of ratification.225 
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When the federal cabinet decided to ratify CITES, Environment Canada was designated as both 
the Management Authority and the Scientific Authority for Canada.  Both responsibilities were 
subsequently delegated to the Canadian Wildlife Service, an agency within the Department of the 
Environment. As prescribed by CITES, the Management Authority is directly responsible for 
communicating with other CITES parties and reporting to the Secretariat.  Additionally, at the 
federal level, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Canadian Forest Service and the 
Canadian Wildlife Service each appointed a Scientific Authority for wildlife and flora under their 
respective jurisdictions. Further, each of the provinces and territories appointed Scientific and 
Management Authorities for wildlife within their legislative jurisdiction.   
The organization of WAPPRIITA in Canada reflects the original goals behind the reformation of 
the legislative regime in 1992-1996.  Within Canada, the implementation and administration of 
CITES is performed by an institutional framework composed of both federal and 
provincial/territorial agencies.  The Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS) is responsible for 
managing CITES species in Canada with respect to the international community.  CWS also 
provides the Management Authority and Scientific Authority for imports into Canada of CITES-
listed species.  The provinces and territories control exports out of Canada except those species 
falling under the auspices of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans or the Canadian Forest 
Service.  The Law Enforcement Office of Environment Canada is responsible for border controls.  
Furthermore, each province and territory has a separate Management and Scientific Authority 
that manages wildlife within its borders and issues export permits in that regard (except for 
Alberta which has withdrawn from the CITES framework).226 
Identification of Items Subject to Regulation 
The system of institutional oversight established by CITES requires that member states and 
citizens of the member states are aware of what items – be it hazardous waste or endangered 
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species- are subject to regulation.  In order to achieve this, an open legitimate process must be 
implemented, both domestically and internationally, that clearly identifies the items subject to 
regulation.  Further, an open process following both established pro forma rules and informal 
“rules in use” must be adopted so that there is consensus on what items should be added or 
deleted from the convention as circumstances change.  There are three components to this 
process: classification and definition, labelling and amendments to the convention to 
accommodate changing circumstances.   
Inclusion of items on the lists is based on the precautionary approach.  That is to say 
that inclusion does not require scientific certainty that a given waste is hazardous or a 
given species is endangered.227 The process also reflects the principle that states may 
exercise their sovereignty to preserve resources or protect the environment.  As such, 
states can unilaterally add items to the list of items subject to regulation (subject of 
course to international trade rules).  In this way, CITES requires constant consensus 
building amongst stakeholders domestically to keep the domestic regime consistent 
with international obligations.  In Canada, this means that the federal government must 
engage with the institutionalized federal-provincial environmental regime to 
implement MEAs domestically.   
 
Like the conventions that preceded it that were aimed at conservation generally228, CITES relies 
on a system of party-negotiated lists of species over which the specific subject of trade is 
regulated internationally. Three appendices are part of the Convention with lists of species over 
which restriction of trade is placed in decreasing levels of control.  Appendix I contains an agreed 
“black list” of prohibited species and Appendix II a “grey list” of controlled species.229 
Furthermore each country of origin may unilaterally add to the lists by entering species in 
Appendix III. 
Appendix I is designated to include all species threatened with extinction, which are, or may be, 
affected by trade. The Convention requires the parties to implement measures to restrict trade, 
through domestic regulation, of these species: “in order not to endanger further their survival”.  
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Trade in species listed in Appendix I is authorized only in exceptional circumstances.  As a 
result, trade in these species is essentially banned.230 
Appendix II includes all species which, although not necessarily now threatened with extinction, 
may become so unless trade is subject to strict regulation aimed at avoiding utilization 
incompatible with their survival.  Appendix II also includes other species that the COP recognises 
must be subject to regulation in order to bring under effective control species that may become 
threatened by extinction. This approach is implicitly precautionary.231 Finally, any party may 
identify a species that should be subject to the CITES regime when being exported from its 
jurisdiction.  These species are included in Appendix III. 
The COP practices an “asymmetrical” approach in the criteria that it uses for de-listing a species.  
By this I mean that the procedure for de-listing is not the mirror image of listing.  The criteria for 
de-listing a species require positive scientific evidence that the plant or animal can withstand the 
exploitation resulting from its removal from the protection of the treaty.232 
Where appropriate and feasible, a CITES Management Authority may affix a mark upon any 
specimen to assist in identifying the specimen. For these purposes "mark" means any indelible 
imprint, lead seal or other suitable means of identifying a specimen, designed in such a way as to 
render its imitation by unauthorized persons as difficult as possible.233 
CITES amendments are subject to a four-stage process: proposal, consultation, adoption and 
ratification.  It is important to distinguish between the amendment of the appendices to CITES 
and amendments to the Convention itself.  Further, CITES distinguishes between amendments to 
Appendices I and II (the “international” lists) and Appendix III (the “domestic” list).  Article XV 
deals with Amendments to the Appendices I and II.   Any Party may propose an amendment to 
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Appendix I or II for consideration at the next COP.  The text of the proposed amendment must be 
communicated to the Secretariat at least 150 days before the COP. 234 
Consistent with MEAs tendency to rely on consultation with parties, the CITES Secretariat then 
consults the other parties and interested bodies, such as NGOs, on the amendment.235 Indeed, the 
convention places specific obligations on the Secretariat to consult with inter-governmental 
bodies having a function in relation to marine species if the proposed amendments deal with such 
species.236 Parties have 60 days to communicate comments on proposed amendments.237 
Amendments to Appendices I and II must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of parties present 
and voting. Amendments adopted at a meeting shall enter into force 90 days after that meeting for 
all parties, except those that register a reservation.238 Until the reservation is withdrawn the party 
is treated as a non-party to CITES with respect to trade in the species concerned.239 
Article XVI of CITES addresses amendments to Appendix III.  Unlike amendments to the 
“international” lists, amendments to the “domestic” lists require less consultation with the parties.   
Any party may at any time submit to the Secretariat a list of species that it has identified as being 
subject to regulation within its jurisdiction.240 Each list submitted must be communicated to the 
parties by the Secretariat as soon as possible after receiving it. The list shall take effect as part of 
Appendix III 90 days after the date of such communication.   After the communication of such 
list, any party may by notification in writing to the Government of the party amending its list 
enter a reservation with respect to the amendment and the state shall be treated as a non-party to 
CITES with respect to trade in the species concerned. 241 The party must also submit to the 
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Secretariat a copy of all domestic laws and regulations applicable to the protection of the species 
added to Appendix III along with any amendments to the laws and regulations.242 
Conversely, a party that has submitted a species for inclusion in Appendix III may withdraw it at 
any time by notification to the Secretariat the removal of any species from Appendix III which 
will be communicated to all parties.243 
Article XVII governs amendments to the CITES convention itself.  There are more onerous 
procedural requirements on parties seeking such amendments.  An extraordinary meeting of the 
COP must be convened by the Secretariat on the written request of at least one-third of the parties 
to consider and adopt amendments to CITES.244 The text of any proposed amendment shall be 
communicated by the Secretariat to all Parties at least 90 days before the meeting.  Amendments 
to the Convention must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of parties present and voting.245 
Amendments to the convention itself enter into force 60 days after two-thirds of the parties have 
deposited an instrument of acceptance.  However, unlike amendments to the Appendices, 
amendments to the convention do not enter into force for parties not accepting the amendment.246 
Moreover, such parties are not treated as non-parties to the convention for any purposes. 
 
Parties are obligated to implement amendments to the convention itself and its appendices 
domestically.  In this way, the CITES COP exhibits the typical institutional arrangements 
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exhibited by MEAs as described by Churchill and Ulfstein247 as well as the outward signs of 
legitimate decision-making identified by Bodansky248.
1.1.1 Domestic Identification of Endangered Species
The Wild Animal and Plant Trade Regulations249 were promulgated in 1996 and brought 
WAPRIITA into effect.  The main feature of the regulations is its schedules.  The schedules list 
the species of flora and fauna in the CITES appendices as well as species not listed in the 
convention but regulated in Canada domestically.250 Environment Canada also distributes widely 
a list of CITES regulated species in its publication, CITES Control List, to regular importers and 
exporters of wildlife.251 
The Wild Animal and Plant Trade Regulations also set out labelling specifications.  Where a 
person imports into Canada, or exports from Canada, anything that is identified by a mark, label 
or accompanying document that indicates that the thing is an animal or plant, or a part or 
derivative of one, that is listed in Schedule I or II of the Act, that thing is, unless there is evidence 
that raises a reasonable doubt to the contrary, deemed to be the thing so identified.252 Exports to 
other national jurisdictions are subject to the receiving state’s labelling requirements in addition 
to these Canadian ones. 
 
Prior Informed Consent 
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A widely accepted principle of international environmental law is that states are required to 
cooperate with each other in mitigating transboundary environmental risks.  A requirement of 
prior consultation is a “natural counterpart of the concept of equitable utilization of a shared 
resource.”253 As a result, states have attached procedural requirements of prior notification and 
consultation with other states and international institutions in many conventions.254 
There is a long-standing principle that states cannot dictate to other states what measures must be 
taken to prevent the endangerment of marine-based species.  Instead, states must cooperate in 
determining what measures should be taken to preserve species in international waters, for 
example.255 With unilateral action unavailable to states to preserve species outside their borders, 
treaties dealing with endangered species, such as CITES, are designed to come to international 
consensus on what species are at risk and what action to take to prevent their extinction.  The 
main purpose of CITES is to ensure that states are aware of, and consent to, the export of 
endangered species from their borders.  Concomitantly, the treaty obligates states to ensure that 
proper notification has been given to a state of export of an endangered species prior to allowing 
such species to enter the jurisdiction of an importing state.  
 
CITES has a system of prior informed consent.256 The parties to CITES are subject to a blanket 
ban on allowing trade in specimens of species included in Appendices I, II and III except in 
accordance with the provisions of the convention.257 In order to obtain this consent, the 
convention requires parties to allow export of endangered species of flora and fauna only where 
an export permit has been issued. Because the appendices reflect different levels of 
endangerment, different standards are applied to each Appendix when a state’s Management 
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Authority is considering issuing a permit.  CITES institutionalizes the core ideas of cooperation, 
transparency, sustainable use and a precautionary approach to conservation by subjecting all 
wildlife imports, including trade with third parties, to mandatory licensing with permits, a kind of 
“passport”, to be issued by the exporting countries.258 
Regulation of Trade in Specimens of Species Included in Appendix I is specifically addressed by 
Article three of CITES.259 The export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix I 
requires the prior grant and presentation of an export permit. An export permit will only be 
granted when the following conditions have been met: 260 
4. the Scientific Authority of the state of export has advised that such export 
will not be detrimental to the survival of that species; 
5. the Management Authority of the state of export is satisfied that the 
specimen was not obtained in contravention of the laws of that state for the protection of 
fauna and flora;  
6. the Management Authority of the state of export is satisfied that any living 
specimen will be so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to 
health or cruel treatment; and 
7. the Management Authority of the state of export is satisfied that an import 
permit has been granted for the specimen. 
Conversely, under CITES the import of any specimen of a species included in Appendix I 
requires the prior grant and presentation of an import permit and either an export permit or 
a re-export certificate. An import permit shall only be granted when the following 
conditions have been met:261 
3. the Scientific Authority of the state of import has advised that the import will be for 
purposes which are not detrimental to the survival of the species involved; 
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4. the Scientific Authority of the state of import is satisfied that the proposed recipient of a 
living specimen is suitably equipped to house and care for it; and 
5. the Management Authority of the state of import is satisfied that the specimen is not to be 
used for primarily commercial purposes. 
There are parallel provisions dealing with the introduction from the sea of any species included in 
Appendix I. 262 
Article four addresses the regulation of trade in species included in Appendix II in a similar 
manner to Appendix I. The export of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II also 
requires the prior grant and presentation of an export permit. An export permit shall only be 
granted when the conditions set out for species in Appendix I have been met. 263 Similarly, the 
import of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II requires the prior presentation of 
either an export permit or a re-export certificate and the re-export of any specimen of a species 
included in Appendix II requires the prior grant and presentation of a re-export certificate, which 
may be granted only when conditions, identical to those required when exporting an item under 
Appendix I, are met.264 However, because of the scientific basis underlying condition one, it is 
implicitly easier to trade in species listed in Appendix II which contains species less endangered 
than those listed in Appendix I. 
Similarly, the introduction from the sea of any specimen of a species included in Appendix II 
requires the prior grant of a certificate from the Management Authority of the state of 
introduction. Again, the conditions to meet are identical to those for species included in 
Appendix I.265 
Article 4 further requires that the Scientific Authority in each party monitor both the export 
permits granted by that state for specimens of species included in Appendix II and the actual 
exports of such specimens. Whenever a Scientific Authority determines that the export of a 
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species should be limited in order to maintain that species throughout its range, at a level 
consistent with its role in the ecosystem, and well above the level at which that species might 
become eligible for inclusion in Appendix I, the Scientific Authority must advise the appropriate 
Management Authority of suitable measures to be taken to limit the grant of export permits for 
that species.266 
Article 5 of CITES regulates trade in species included in Appendix III.   The export of any 
specimen of a species from any state, which has included that species in Appendix III, requires 
the prior grant and presentation of an export permit. An export permit must only be granted when 
the conditions that must be met for granting an export permit for species in Appendix I have been 
met.267 The import of any specimen of a species included in Appendix III requires the prior 
presentation of a certificate of origin and, where the import is from a state which has included 
that species in Appendix III, an export permit.268 Finally, in the case of re-export, a certificate 
granted by the Management Authority of the State of re-export that the specimen was processed 
in that state or is being re-exported shall be accepted by the state of import as evidence that the 
provisions of the present Convention have been complied with in respect of the specimen 
concerned.269 
Where export or re-export is to, or import is from, a state not a party to CITES, comparable 
documentation issued by the competent authorities in that state which substantially conforms 
with the CITES requirements for permits and certificates may be accepted in lieu thereof by any 
party.270 
The convention requires parties’ Management Authorities to issue permits prior to allowing trade 
in endangered species that reflect the importing and exporting states’ consent to the trade.  The 
model for export permits is set forth in Appendix IV.  There is a separate permit for export, re-
export and import of endangered species.  The permits are valid for a period of six months from 
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the date on which they were granted.  The permits must comply with Article 6 of the Convention 
which provides: 
• The permit must contain the information, specified in the model set forth in Appendix 
IV, and may only be used for export within a period of six months from the date on which it was 
granted; 
• Each permit or certificate must contain the title of the present Convention, the name and 
any identifying stamp of the Management Authority granting it and a control number assigned by 
the Management Authority; 
• Any copies of a permit or certificate issued by a Management Authority shall be clearly 
marked as copies only and no such copy may be used in place of the original, except to the extent 
endorsed thereon; and 
• A separate permit or certificate shall be required for each consignment of specimens. 
1.0.0 Prior Informed Consent to Domestic and International Trade in Endangered 
Species in Canada
WAPPRIITA271 improves the controls on the illegal trade of wildlife and plants that was in place 
under the old legislative regime and prohibits trafficking of endangered species. WAPPRIITA 
prohibits any commercial trade in endangered species unless a permit accompanies it. In addition 
to contributing to the conservation of Canadian and foreign wild species, it is designed to protect 
Canadian ecosystems from the introduction of undesirable species that could harm Canadian 
species.  For less threatened species, trade is monitored and regulated through a permit system. 
Indeed, section 4 of the Act specifically states:272 
The purpose of this Act is to protect certain species of animals and plants, particularly by 
implementing the Convention and regulating international and interprovincial trade in animals 
and plants. 
There is a blanket prohibition on importing into Canada any animal or plant that was possessed, 
distributed or transported in contravention of any law of any foreign state.273 Further, no person 
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may import into Canada, or export from Canada, any animal or plant deemed endangered except 
by way of permit. 
WAPPRIITA also requires a permit to transfer any animal or plant deemed endangered from one 
province to another province.274 This may be in addition to a provincial permit.  Finally, 
transport of an animal or plant from one province to another where the animal or plant was 
possessed, distributed or transported in contravention of any provincial Act or regulation is 
prohibited.275 The Act equally prohibits the possession of any animal or plant listed in Appendix 
I of the Convention or that has been imported or transported in contravention of the Act.276 
In an effort to comply with CITES’ documentation requirements, section nine of the Act requires 
every person who imports into Canada, exports from Canada, or transports from one province to 
another province, an animal or plant, to keep any documents that are required to be kept by the 
regulations.  Section 10 of the Act allows the Minister to issue permits for interprovincial 
transportation of plants and animals.  In order to keep a closer record of high-volume exporters 
such as florists and to improve administrative efficiency, the Canadian Wildlife Service allows 
these exporters and importers to apply for blanket permits to allow an unlimited number of 
transactions over a year.  In exchange, the exporter/importer must file yearly reports outlining the 
transactions.277 In practice, the federal government issues import permits for all species and 
export permits for those species under its jurisdiction. Species under federal jurisdiction include, 
for example, migratory birds.278 
Provincial governments issue permits for export of all wild flora and fauna within their border.  
The exception is Alberta, which withdrew from the domestic CITES regime in 1995.  When 
Black Bears were added to Appendix II of CITES in 1992 because of a large market in Asia for 
the Black Bear’s gall bladder, Alberta and British Columbia found the number of permits too 
large and the administrative requirements overly onerous. As a result, Alberta and B.C. stopped 
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issuing permits altogether (for all species) in 1995 with the Federal government taking control of 
issuing export permits for flora and fauna originating from that province.  B.C. has since resumed 
issuing permits.279 
Alberta continues to rely on the federal government to issue export permits.  According to 
officials with Alberta Environment, they have no involvement in enforcement although it retains 
the title of Management Authority for the province.  There is no involvement with the Canadian 
Wildlife Service and the Canadian Wildlife Service does not ask it to do anything to implement 
Canada’s obligations under CITES.  However, Alberta wildlife officers are occasionally 
seconded to the Canadian Wildlife Service for training in enforcing the restrictions on 
interprovincial trade under WAPRITTA.280 
The Wild Animal and Plant Trade Regulations specify conditions under which a permit must be 
obtained for export or import of wild flora and fauna into or out of Canada. Under section 6 of 
the Regulations, a person who imports into Canada an animal or plant that is listed as "fauna" or 
"flora" in Appendix II or Appendix III to the Convention but is not listed in Schedule II of the 
Act (or any part or derivative of any such animal or plant) is exempted from holding a permit 
issued under the Act where the person has obtained: “before import, a permit, certificate or 
written authorization that satisfies the requirements of the Convention and is granted by a 
competent authority in the country of export.”  Under section 7 of the Regulations, no person 
may export from or import into Canada any “plant” or “animal” included in the Appendices to 
the convention (including living and dead plants and animals and eggs, sperms, tissue cultures, 
embryos, spores or pollen).281 
With respect to plants and animals listed in Schedule II, but not in the Appendices of the 
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as long as the province from which it is being exported does not prohibit it.   The Regulations 
also specify conditions under which live animals may be transported for export from Canada.282 
The Regulations also govern interprovincial transport of wild plants and animals.  Under section 
6(3) of the Act, interprovincial transport of wild plants and animals deemed endangered is 
prohibited absent a permit issued under Act.  Permits are obtained from the province from which 
the species originated is regulated or banned.283 However, Regulations allow for several 
exemptions to the permit requirements for export and import of wild plants and animals including 
animals raised in captivity,284 pets,285 personal effects,286 and hunting trophies.287 Nevertheless, 
the regulations require persons subject to such exemptions to sign a declaration.288 The 
exemptions are also subject to several conditions listed in section 18 of the interprovincial 
regulations. 
Information Sharing with Other Parties and Citizens of Member States 
As was explained in Part I of the paper, legitimate domestic implementation of international law 
requires open dialogue between citizens and communities.  As such, legitimacy at the 
international level requires that the institutional structures hold open debates and adopt measures 
based on consensus and accurate information.  Indeed, the majority of the environmental 
conventions provide for some form of compliance monitoring by the COP, under which party 
states must submit reports on their performance on a regular basis.  These reports are made 
available to all parties, and are reviewed by the COP.289 Procedures to monitor and gather 
information are deemed essential elements for a satisfactory system of compliance control.290 
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Domestically, this is also true.  In order to internalize international norms domestically, member 
states must persuade citizens that the international norms justify adopting restrictions.  This is 
done through open dialogue and making the requirements of the conventions well known to the 
people generally but, more specifically, those who are directly affected by the provisions of the 
convention.  Neither convention specifically addresses what measures should be taken to increase 
awareness within a member state of individual obligations under the respective conventions.  
However, the conventions do impose requirements on member states to make reports to the COP.  
These requirements have been replicated and expanded domestically in Canada.  
 
Information on member states’ compliance with CITES comes from two main sources: self-
reporting by members and compliance monitoring by the Secretariat.291 Under CITES, the 
Secretariat must convene regular meetings at least once every two years where the parties’ 
implementation procedures are reviewed.292 Along with the parties to the convention, CITES 
allows for agencies technically “qualified in protection, conservation or management of wild 
fauna and flora”, as well as states not parties to the convention to observe meetings.293 
Specifically, a review of the progress made towards the restoration and conservation of the 
species included in Appendices I, II and III is made during these meetings.294 To that end, each 
party is required to prepare periodic reports on its implementation of CITES to the Secretariat 
consisting of a biennial report on legislative, regulatory and administrative measures taken to 
enforce the provisions of the convention which must be available to the public. 295 
When the Secretariat believes that any species included in Appendix I or II is being affected 
adversely by trade in specimens of that species, or that the provisions of the convention are not 
being effectively implemented, it is required to communicate that to the authorized Management 
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Authority of the party or parties concerned. The issue will then be reviewed by the next COP, 
which may make whatever recommendations it deems appropriate.296 
To fulfill its mandate in this regard, the COP relies on an extensive state and non-state reporting 
network.  Information about implementation of CITES enters the reporting process pursuant to 
the provisions of the agreement.  There are now strict deadlines for the submission of annual 
reports on trade and guidelines for reporting.297 
Trade information from the parties is compiled in a database at the Wildlife Trade Monitoring 
Unit (WTMU) in Cambridge, UK.   The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Unit began in the 1970s as 
part of Trade Records Analysis of Fauna and Flora in Commerce International (TRAFFIC).298 In 
1990, TRAFFIC became a separate international body.  It monitors trade in fauna and flora and 
has an extensive network of separate international bodies.  It monitors trade in fauna and flora 
and has an extensive network of NGOs it works with at the domestic level.299 One of the 
network’s primary functions is to keep national authorities informed of illicit trade.    
TRAFFIC also keeps in close contact with the WTMU and the Ramsar Bureau (which keeps 
track of reports from parties to the Ramsar Convention) as well as the World Wildlife 
Foundation.  The database at WTMU has over 2.5 million trade records.  The database allows 
import and export records to be cross-referenced and to identify anomalies in reporting.300 The 
WTMU informs the secretariat of such anomalies.  The secretariat then investigates the parties 
involved for non-compliance.  Infractions reported by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
are also entered into the database.  A report presented at each COP publishes alleged infractions.  
NGOs such as the WWF supply information to supplement national reports.301 According to 
Peter Sand, the former Secretary General of CITES, and Rosalind Reeve, cooperation with the 
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TRAFFIC network has given CITES one of the best operational information sources of any 
MEA. 302 
The Canadian Wildlife Service conducts an extensive advertising campaign at ports of entry to 
instil the importance of regulating trade in endangered species in travelers.303 Environment 
Canada also distributes widely a list of CITES regulated species in its publication, CITES Control 
List, to regular importers and exporters of wildlife.304 All of this is part of an effort to increase 
the stigma attached to trade in endangered species in order to encourage Canadians to refuse to 
buy products made from endangered species while abroad and report those who do bring such 
products into the country.305 WAPPRIITA further attempts to improve on federal-provincial 
cooperation by allowing the federal government to enter into agreements with the government of 
any province to: “provide for the cooperative management and administration of this Act and to 
avoid conflict between, and duplication in, federal and provincial regulatory activity.”306 
Scientific Authorities in the provinces and federal departments collect information on use and 
populations of species from the WAPPRITA permits issued and complement that with 
information gathered from wildlife officials.  This information is used, along with information 
collected internationally and reported to the Secretariat, to determine what species should be 
added to, or taken off, the list of species in the WAPPRITA.  This information is also used to 
develop positions with respect to international protection of species.307 
Enforcement  
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Enforcement has been defined as the “formal legally circumscribed reaction to a breach of an 
obligation”.308 A distinction can be made between national and international enforcement.  
National enforcement is the reaction to breaches of national law.  Conversely, international 
enforcement is the response to states that fail to fulfill their international legal obligations.309 
CITES has provisions to address non-compliance by member states.  The convention equally 
requires member states to put into place legislative provisions domestically that enforce the 
restrictions on trade that are required to be implemented by the convention.  This explicit 
obligation on states to penalize certain behaviour of their subjects is an unusual feature in 
international conventions on environmental protection.310 However, it is likely necessary.  While 
legal structures that rely on a logic of consequences for compliance must use the threat of 
punishment, regimes that seek to rely on a logic of appropriateness require such provisions to an 
extent as well.  For example, an individual is willing to accept a limit on the number of fish that 
can be caught where he or she has been convinced that this will protect the resource for future use 
and will apply to others as well.  If others catch more than the limit and no enforcement occurs, 
the individual is encouraged to reconsider the decision to comply.  Accordingly, both conventions 
require member states to implement an enforcement regime.  This paper will therefore examine 
how the Canadian federation addressed the enforcement of obligations under CITES. 
 
CITES imposes minimum obligations on member states with the explicit authorization to adopt 
more stringent domestic measures.311 In this way, CITES respects the sovereignty of the parties 
to choose their own policy instruments as they are the best positioned to determine how best to 
protect their own wildlife and plantlife.  CITES also reflects the general consensus recognized in 
international environmental law that cooperation between states is essential for the protection of 
biodiversity.  In particular, the preamble specifically refers to over-exploitation through 
international trade as a threat to biodiversity.312 
Member states of CITES are compelled to take appropriate measures to enforce the provisions of 
the convention and to prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof.  However any party is free 
 
308 Martti Koskenniemi, “New Institutions and Procedures for Implementation Control and Reaction”, in Jacob 
Werksman (ed.), Greening International Institutions, (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1996) at 237 as cited by 
R. Reeve, supra note 317 at 17 
309 R. Reeve, id at 17, 92. 
310 Id at 233. 
311 CITES, supra note 522, Article 14, Paragraph 1. 
312 Id, preamble. 
76
to adopt stricter measures on species listed in the Appendices or regulate trade in species not 
listed in the Appendices.313 At a minimum, however, a state must adopt measures that: 314 
3. penalize trade in, or possession of, species listed in the Appendices; and  
4. provide for the confiscation or return to the state of export of such species.  
The parties are also required to ensure that specimens of species listed will pass through any 
formalities required for trade with a minimum of delay. To facilitate expeditious trade, a party 
may designate ports of exit and ports of entry at which specimens must be presented for 
clearance.315 
The Standing Committee of the CITES COP is the principal instrument for collective action 
against non-compliance.  The Standing Committee has imposed trade bans on: the United Arab 
Emirates from 1985 to 1990; Thailand from 1991 to 1992; and Italy from 1992 to 1993.316 Most 
recently, the Secretariat, on the instructions of the Standing Committee, issued a notification to 
the parties recommending that the parties suspend trade in endangered species with India and 
Gambia in CITES-listed species because those states failed to submit evidence of legislative 
progress to enact adequate legislation implementing the CITES obligations.317 The Secretariat 
also uses its reports as a means to focus negative publicity on member states that are in non-
compliance with the convention.318 
1.0.0 Domestic Enforcement
In order to deal with the shortage of wildlife officers enforcing CITES domestically, which was a 
recurring problem under the old system, WAPPRIITA allows the Minister to designate people to 
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act as officers to enforce the Act and prescribe their powers.319 Specifically, the Act gives 
officers power to detain any thing that has been imported into, or is about to be exported from, 
Canada, or from one province to another, until the officer is satisfied that the thing has been dealt 
with in accordance with the Act and the regulations.320 Furthermore, the officer may order the 
removal of the plant or animal from Canada.321 
Under WAPPRIITA, a person can be prosecuted anywhere in Canada for contravening a 
provincial law, as well as for violating foreign legislation.322 Every person who contravenes a 
provision of WAPPRIITA may be prosecuted and fined up to $100,000.00 and faces up to six 
months in prison.  In the case of a corporation, the fine can be as high as $300,000.00.  For 
subsequent offences, these amounts may be doubled.  The court may also order the offender to 
take remedial action and fine them an additional amount equal to any pecuniary benefit they may 
have received from the illegal traffic.323 The court also has the power to give suspended 
sentences with the criminal conviction vacated once certain court-imposed conditions are met.324 
CONCLUSION 
CITES seeks to both ensure effective conservation of species as well as to regulate trade in 
species.325 The purpose of these trade restrictions is to gather information on trade in endangered 
or near-endangered species to encourage sustainable use.  However, rather than imposing a 
supranational regulatory mechanism of its own, CITES relies on reciprocal recognition of 
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national decisions, provided that these are made in accordance with mutually agreed standards.  It 
is then left to the domestic Management Authorities to operate the system on behalf of the 
international community.  When Canada ratified CITES, it attempted to implement its obligations 
through existing legislation.  However, as international environmental norms evolved it became 
apparent that Canada, while meeting CITES’ minimum obligations, was not complying with the 
broader purpose of CITES to promote sustainable use of the world’s flora and fauna and, in a 
more holistic sense, preserve the world’s biodiversity.   
Accordingly, the federal government attempted to establish a new legislative regime that 
reflected these broader goals while still respecting the federal contract.  The new regime is the 
result of extensive federal-provincial dialogue that both reflects the broader international goals of 
CITES and is consistent with Canadians’ understanding of Canadian federalism.   The new 
legislative regime, consisting of the WAPPRITTA and its regulations, addresses the five areas of 
obligations set down by CITES: institutional oversight, identification of items subject to 
regulation, prior informed consent, information sharing and enforcement and makes them 
applicable to interprovincial trade in flora and fauna with standards similar to the international 
ones laid down by CITES. 
According to Professor Koh, transnational legal process is:326 
…the process whereby an international law rule is interpreted through the interaction of 
transnational actors in a variety of law-declaring fora, then internalized into a nation’s domestic 
legal system. 
Professor Koh claims that the process of transnational legal process answers the question: “why 
do nations obey?”.327 I would posit that this process might be applied to the question: “why do 
provinces obey?”.  Typically, provinces have no choice to obey.  A federal government acting in 
a constitutionally sanctioned field of legislative jurisdiction may impose its will on the sub-units.  
Such unilateral action is usually not available to the Canadian federal government in 
implementing national environmental policy for two reasons.  First, legislative jurisdiction is split 
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between the provinces and the federal government.  Second, both the provinces and federal 
government have committed to consensus decision making in the environmental field.  Several 
hundred agreements, legislative initiatives, a constitutional history marked by a contractualist 
understanding of federalism and the general “rules in use” with respect to Canadian 
environmental policy-making have served to institutionalize collaborative federalism. 
Global governance involves a community of states taking on the responsibility for addressing 
common problems through a variety of political processes, which are inclusive in character, and 
have a sense of the collective interest over the particular interests of individual states.328 
Important in this system of governance is the extensive network of supervisory bodies, COPs and 
commissions established by environmental treaties.329 These treaties rely on institutional 
machinery in the form of inter-governmental commissions and meetings of treaty parties as a 
means of coordinating policy, developing the law, supervising its implementation, putting 
community pressure on individual states and resolving conflicts of interest.330 
CITES is an important part of this network of global environmental governance.  It establishes an 
institutional framework charged with ensuring compliance with the conventions and monitoring 
international trade.  The international institutions establish a dialogue with their national 
counterparts to gather scientific information and produce lists of hazardous wastes or endangered 
species that will be subject to international trading regulation.  In turn, some trade is banned 
outright or may only take place with the prior informed consent of member states.  The 
information gathered from the regulated trade in hazardous waste and endangered species is 
shared with other member states, interested persons and non-governmental organizations.  
Finally, both conventions require member states to institute domestic measures to punish trade 
that is contrary to the provisions of the conventions.    
The domestic implementation in Canada of CITES was a long process.  When Canada ratified the 
convention it already had the domestic legislation in place to comply with the minimum 
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requirements of the treaties.  However, through an integrated process of institutional interaction 
at the provincial-federal level through the CCME and a subsequent broader consultation process 
involving stakeholders, the treaty was more deeply integrated into Canadian society.  As a result, 
the domestic regime was revised in a manner that better reflects the broader goals of these two 
treaties.   
The domestic implementation of CITES in Canada is an important demonstration of the dynamics 
of international law-making in a federal regime.  In a federal regime, the national government 
speaks for the nation-state on the international stage.  However, the commitments cannot be 
internalized domestically without extensive involvement of the constituent governments as well 
as civil society.   
This paper has attempted to explain the role transnational legal process might play in an 
examination of the implementation of MEAs in Canada.  Professor Koh describes the utility of 
transnational legal process to legal analysis as:331 
…a theory of transnational legal process has both predictive capacity and explanatory power 
regarding questions of causation.  It predicts that nations will come into compliance with 
international norms if transnational legal processes are aggressively triggered by other 
transnational actors in a way that forces interaction in forums capable of generating norms, 
followed by norm-internalization.   This process of interaction and internalization in turn leads a 
national government to engage in new modes of interest-recognition and identity-formation in a 
way that eventually leads the nation-state back into compliance. 
Part I of this paper examined transnational legal process with respect to its predictive capacity in 
the milieu of Canadian environmental governance.  The following conclusions can be made in 
this regard: 
1. Successful domestic implementation of international norms follows a pattern of relations 
described as transnational legal process whereby international and domestic actors, both 
governmental and non-governmental, interact in a variety of public and private fora to make, 
enforce and ultimately internalize rules of international law. 
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2. When international rules are internalized, they are obeyed out of a “logic of 
appropriateness” rather than a “logic of consequences”.  Where international rules are accepted 
on the basis of a “logic of appropriateness” they are view as more legitimate than those rules that 
rely on a “logic of consequences”.  
3. Legitimate policy is based on the consent of the governed.  Consent can be demonstrated 
through implementation procedures both consistent with the pro forma rules and “rules in use” 
which arise from historical patterns of interaction.    
4. Federalism is a form of government based on the consent of political communities to 
come together for the common benefit of a greater federation.  Accordingly, community is an 
important basis upon which citizens of a federal state perceive the legitimacy of a given action.  
Any policy enacted in a federation that particularly affects a given sub-unit in the federation must 
be consistent with both the constitutional division of powers as well as historical patterns of 
relations between the national government and the sub-units.      
5. Environmental governance in Canada is based on an institutionalized form of 
collaborative federalism.  This pattern of relations cannot be ignored when implementing 
international environmental law domestically in Canada.  Policy implementation that is imposed 
on the provincial government is unlikely to be internalized, as it will be difficult to get provincial 
governments to commit or cooperate with environmental policy objectives. 
6. Provincial government opposition to domestic implementation of an MEA, where the 
opposition is maintained in the face of federal policy that is consistent with the established 
pattern of environmental governance, can be overcome where the affected provincial political 
community is convinced of the efficacy of the underlying norms of a given MEA.   
Part II of this paper examined the implementation of CITES within Canada using transnational 
legal process in its descriptive capacity.  The following conclusions can be made in this regard: 
1. Each convention sets up an institutional framework that establishes fairly detailed 
global standards while allowing for regional regulation that takes into account specific local 
needs.  The COP serves as a forum to discuss the ongoing effectiveness of the convention and 
consider amendments to the conventions and their appendices in order to respond to changing 
circumstances.   
2. The conventions share five common categories of obligations: institutional 
oversight; identification of items subject to regulation; prior informed consent; information 
sharing with other parties and citizens of member states; and enforcement.   
3. As international environmental law has evolved since CITES was first concluded, 
the scope of each convention has broadened.  There has been a shift in international policy and 
law from mechanisms focusing on providing a remedy after the event to mechanisms that aim of 
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preventing damage.  This has been informed by increasing international focus on preservation of 
the environment and sustainable development through cooperation among international 
institutions and states and a commitment to the precautionary principle. 
4. The federal government ratified CITES with the intention of using existing federal 
legislation to implement the obligations under the conventions.  However, as international law 
evolved and CITES was increasingly identified with the overall international commitment to 
environmental protection, the existing legislation was increasingly seen as insufficient to address 
these broader holistic goals.   
5. The federal government then entered into extensive dialogue with the provincial 
governments, and others, to establish parallel domestic regulatory regimes governing 
interprovincial trade that mirrored the international ones established by CITES.  These new 
institutional structures were established specifically to address Canada’s obligations under 
CITES.  Further, the new regimes explicitly recognize the role regulation of trade in hazardous 
waste and endangered species plays in protecting the international environment. 
This paper demonstrates the normative force that Canadians’ understanding of federalism has on 
environmental policy.  Environmental policy must take into account the understanding Canadians 
have about the federal-provincial relationship.  This is not to say that environmental policy 
cannot be implemented where it conflicts with federal values.  Instead, policy-makers must 
engage citizens in a dialogue aimed at re-interpreting Canadians’ understanding of the federal 
contract and refashion the “rules in use” so that a given policy is not viewed as an illegitimate 
intrusion on provincial jurisdiction.  In other words, policy-makers must convince citizens to shift 
their allegiance from a particularly affected provincial political community to the federal political 
community and consent to federal environmental policy.   
Ultimately, as was demonstrated by this paper, legitimacy does not depend on whether a rule or a 
decision is substantively correct but instead reflects more general support for a regime, which 
makes subjects willing to substitute the regime’s decisions for their own evaluation of a 
situation.332 
It can be concluded that the regime established domestically to implement CITES has been 
accepted as legitimate although perhaps not fully internalized.  CITES was implemented 
primarily by basing its legitimacy on Canadians’ perceptions of federalism.  A consensual 
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process was followed that was consistent with the prevailing mode of environmental governance 
in Canada.  However, as the conventions continue to evolve it may be impossible to continue to 
implement them through a consensual process.  Indeed, it has been predicted that international 
institutions may be compelled to depart from purely consensual modes of decision making in 
order to avoid gridlock and least-common denominator outcomes.333 
One could argue that it is possible for the federal government to act unilaterally in the 
environmental field if the policy goals are seen as legitimate.  The federal government was able 
to act unilaterally in areas of provincial concern such as health, education and welfare not 
because it was constitutionally permitted but because a broad consensus was reached that the 
policy goals were appropriate and the federal government was better able to fund the services.  
The provincial governments, because of this consensus, generally accept unilateralism and the 
constitutional legality of the policy model has also been generally accepted.    Professors Robert 
Tucker and David Hendrickson state:334 
Legitimacy arises from the conviction that state action proceeds within the ambit of 
law, in two senses: first, that action issues from rightful authority, that is, from the 
political institution authorized to take it; and second, that it does not violate a legal or 
moral norm.  Ultimately, however, legitimacy is rooted in opinion, and thus actions 
that are unlawful in either of these senses may, in principle, still be deemed 
legitimate.  That is why it is an elusive quality.  Despite these vagaries, there can be 
no doubt that legitimacy is a vital thing to have, and illegitimacy a condition devoutly 
to be avoided. 
Therefore, where there is a broad-based consensus as to the appropriateness of the proposed 
policy, and acceptance that the federal government is better able to accomplish the goals of the 
policy, federal unilateralism will be accepted.  Where the people sense that federal intervention 
will be illegitimate, however, collaborative federalism will dominate.  Nevertheless, for the most 
part, given the strength of the provincial political communities in the environmental regime, it is 
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doubtful the federal government will act unilaterally to implement any future changes to its 
obligations under CITES.   
Although there are scenarios where the norms underlying a MEA or a new international 
environmental obligation may be internalized deeply enough in Canada to divorce citizens from 
their provincial political communities and, consequently, be seen as a legitimate policy in spite of 
its inconsistency with the accepted federal environmental regime, these instances will be rare.  
Unless it is absolutely necessary to implement an MEA, the federal government will not be able 
to rely on unilateral action because of the strength, and institutionalized nature, of the 
collaborative model in the environmental regime.   
While internalization may require extensive interaction among state and non-state actors, the role 
of constituent units in internalization is integral.  This is particularly true in Canada where the 
murky nature of constitutional responsibility over the environment has necessarily led to a 
collaborative model of federalism.  Federalism is a defining feature of the Canadian polity and 
the provincial political communities’ understanding of the federal contract must always be 
considered when implementing international environmental law domestically.  The historical 
basis of federalism, coupled with its evolution both in constitutional jurisprudence and political 
negotiations, has made the “fact of federalism” along with Rawls’ “fact of pluralism” an 
unavoidable reality.  As Alan Cairns states:335 
Federalism, which had been viewed as transitional by some of the more centralist inclined 
English-Canadian politicians at Confederation, rooted itself deeply in Canadian society.  Its 
natural and strong Quebec base of support was supplemented by the institutional self-interest of 
the political and administrative class that operated the provincial order of governments.  Further, 
as the country expanded from four to ten provinces, the increasingly complex tasks of managing 
space and accommodating territorial diversity enhanced the utility of federalism. 
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While implementation of international environmental norms may be possible through unilateral 
federal government action,336 the presence of strong provincial political communities in Canada 
will more than likely make such action seem illegitimate and internalization of the norms will be 
incomplete.  Not just the formal constitutional framework and, its historical interpretation, under 
which the Canadian federal system operates but also the long-standing “rules in use” that make 
up the Canadian view of legitimacy in the federal system, support this.337 
336 see for example, P. Barton, “Economic Instruments and the Kyoto Protocol: Can Parliament Implement Emissions 
Trading without Provincial Cooperation?” (2002), 40 Alberta Law Review 417. 
337 A. Gotlieb & E. Lederman, “Ignoring the Provinces is not Canada’s Way”, National Post, January 3, 2003, at p. 
A14. 
